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WHERE WORDS FAIL
But if someone were to say “So logic too is an empirical science” he would be wrong. 
Yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to be 
tested by experience, at another as a rule governing such testing. (On Certainty, §98)
A thought makes truth turn on how things are; a given thought on whether things are a given 
way for them to be. A (singly) singular thought, such as that Sid smokes, is decomposable 
into two elements: one making truth turn on how some object is; the other making it turn on 
which objects are some particular way for an object to be. From 1891 on Frege speaks of 
thoughts, and thought-elements, as having what he calls Bedeutung. !e Bedeutung of a 
predicative element, he writes, is what, from 1891 on, he calls a concept; of an element which 
names (makes truth turn on how some given object is) an object. Concepts and objects (he 
seems to say) are fundamentally di"erent: a concept depends for existence on objects to fall 
under it or not; an object is in no such need of completion. No object is a concept; hence no 
concept an object. So he seems to say. But, he also (sometimes) #nds, something prevents our 
saying so.
Sometimes Frege sees language as the obstacle:
Granted, a peculiar obstacle stands in the way of communication with 
the reader, namely, that, with a peculiar necessity of language, my 
expression, taken strictly literally, sometimes misses the thought, in 
that where a concept is meant an object is named.  I am fully aware of 
being directed in such cases to the accommodating good will of the 
reader who will not be sparing with a pinch of salt. (1892: 204)
Sometimes the obstacle appears as ‘the nature of a concept’ itself:
!e nature of a concept is now a great obstacle for proper expression, 
and for communication. Where I want to speak of a concept, language 
forces me with nearly inescapable force to use an un#tting expression, 
by which the thought is obscured—I could almost say falsi#ed. If I say, 
‘the concept equilateral triangle’, one would assume, following the 
linguistic analogy, that I thereby designate a concept, just as, without 
doubt, I name a planet if I say ‘the planet Neptune’. But this is not the 
case; for predicative nature is missing. Accordingly, the Bedeutung of 
the expression ‘!e concept equilateral triangle’ (insofar as there is 
one) is an object. We cannot avoid words such as ‘the concept’, but 
must then always be conscious of their unsuitability. (1892-1895: 130)
!e Bedeutung of ‘!e concept equilateral triangle’ is an object, hence not a concept. A 
concept could only be bedeutet by a certain sort of expression (‘unsaturated’) which, in turn, 
could only function to predicate of something being what that concept was a concept of being 
(e.g., equilateral). Such an expression would yield no predication of a concept. Nor would 
any other which might predicate things of objects. So goes the idea. It looks as if we can say 
what the Bedeutung of a predicative expression is. We would like to say: it is such-and-such 
concept. If Frege is right there is no saying this. Is this insight or confusion?
In a wonderfully provocative essay, “In Search of Logically Alien !ought” (1991), 
James Conant answers  ‘Yes’—on behalf of himself and young Wittgenstein (henceforth 
YW). YW, he observes, was inspired by the idea. He writes:
Another cousin of our problem can be seen in Frege’s treatment of the 
Kerry paradox, when he insists that the words he himself must resort 
to (“the concept horse is not a concept”) in order to illuminate what is 
confused in Kerry’s talk about concepts do not themselves express 
coherent thoughts—any more than Kerry’s own formulations do. …
Frege’s discussion of these two cousins of our problem are 
viewed by many contemporary commentators as among the most 
embarrassing moments in all of his work—sudden signs of an 
otherwise uncharacteristic so$ening of the mind. Yet they are precisely 
the moments in Frege’s work from which Wittgenstein takes himself to 
learn the most. (1991: 140-141)
In that same paragraph, Conant also observes that YW was inspired, too, by another idea of 
Frege’s, this time to a negative response. !is other idea concerns the nature of logic. Conant 
expresses it as the idea that logic is a science. YW expresses his rejection of it in the idea that 
laws of logic ‘say nothing’.
Here is the plan of the present essay. I will argue that YW’s reactions were o" target 
both times. !ey are, I will suggest, among what mature Wittgenstein (henceforth MW) 
came to see as among the Tractatus’ ‘grave mistakes’. Further, to see how YW’s critique of 
Frege’s view of logic misses the mark, it will emerge, is also to see what is wrong with Frege’s 
‘insight’ about concepts and objects. It is the same thing which goes wrong in each. !e essay 
divides in three parts. Part I scouts some notions which will be needed for discussing Frege’s 
obstacle. Part II discusses it. Part III takes up Frege’s, and YW’s, conceptions of logic. It ends 
with MW’s replacement for these.
If Frege is right about the obstacle, I may, from time to time in what follows, try to say 
the unsayable (or say something about concepts which is not really about them). I am betting 
on his being wrong. Pro tem a case that I have succumbed to some such fate should not just 
assume that he is not.
 I
1.1. !oughts First: What blocks saying what it seems there is to say about concepts (and 
objects)? And how does it? For answering these questions some distinctions need to be 
observed. Part I aims to draw them. To begin I follow Frege’s strategy: whole thoughts come 
#rst. In 1919 he put this thus:
What is distinctive in my view of logic is made recognisable, #rst of all, 
by the fact that I put the content of the word ‘true’ at the forefront, and 
then by the fact that I let thoughts follow immediately as that by which 
truth can come into question at all. !us I do not begin with concepts 
and  build thoughts, or judgements, out of them, but I arrive at 
thought-elements by the decomposition of thoughts. (1919a: 273)
In the same vein, in 1882 he wrote,
I do not believe that the formation of concepts could precede 
judgements, because that presupposes an autonomous existence of 
concepts, but I think that concepts arise through the decomposition 
(Zerfallen) of a judgeable content. (1882: 118)
‘Judgeable content’ is Frege’s early term for that by which truth can come into question at all. 
His #rst try at capturing just this, he came to see, built more into it than really belonged 
there. So, by 1891, he split o" what did no work in bringing truth into question, leaving 
behind Sinn, and dubbing what was split o" Bedeutung. Sinn is a species with two genera: 
whole thoughts (ways for truth to come into question); and thought-elements.
A whole thought decomposes (not verotten, but zerfallen), or is decomposable 
(zerlegbar) into elements. An element (on a decomposition) is whatever one thus comes to. 
To decompose a thought is to decompose a given way for truth to come into question; a 
given question of truth. A whole thought represents things as some given way there is for 
things to be. ‘!ings’, so used, blocks the question , ‘Which ones?’. It is the way things are, full 
stop, which is, or is not, as represented.
A general point about decomposition: a Zerfallung, so a Zerlegung, of something is just 
that thing, decomposed; the whole thing, presented as dividing into given parts. So one has a 
decomposition only, but also just, where the elements on it are, jointly, the whole being 
decomposed.
A thought as here conceived has a de#ning mission, or task: to make truth turn in 
such-and-such way on how things are. Decomposing a thought can be thought of as 
decomposing its mission into subtasks. An element of a thought on a decomposition is such 
a subtask, or, if one wishes to reify, precisely that which performs it. Any task can be 
decomposed into subtasks. So far, there is nothing special about thoughts. !e task might be 
whitewashing a casita in a Pueblo Blanco. One might decompose this (in one of countless 
ways) into whitewashing the front façade, whitewashing the rear façade, whitewashing the 
sidewall. A thought’s task is making truth turn in a particular way on how things are. So an 
element in it (on a decomposition) would be making truth turn in part in such-and-such way 
on how things are; or, more fully, making the thought’s way of making truth turn on how 
things are in part its turning in such-and-such way on how things are. Making truth turn on 
whether Sid smokes might, for example, be making truth turn in part on who smokes, or, 
more fully, on whether relevant things smoke (those made so relevant, that is, by other 
elements in the thought).
‘Whole thoughts #rst’ thus loses philosophy a problem. Where a thought is 
decomposed into elements, no intelligible question remains as to what might join those 
elements into ‘the unity’ of a whole thought. Similarly, if whitewashing a casita has been 
decomposed into whitewashing its parts, there is no intelligible question as to what makes 
whitewashing those parts whitewashing the casita. For a thought’s elements to constitute a 
decomposition just is for them, jointly, to be the whole; for those subtasks, each performed in 
performing the others, to be that thought’s identifying task. Losing  a problem, though, has a 
price. It is essential for thought-elements to be what do add up to the whole thought. Where a 
thought makes truth turn on whether Sid smokes, making truth turn on whether things 
which matter smoke might be an element in it—where there is another which makes truth 
turn on whether Sid is ways which matter. Such elements are in the same business as the 
whole: making truth turn on how things are. !ey are also in the thought’s same business, 
representing-as. One represents relevant things as smokers, the other Sid as the one who is 
relevant ways. By contrast (a familiar point) a way for a thing to be—say, such as to smoke—
is not in any of these lines of work. It makes truth turn, even in part, on nothing; represents 
nothing as any given way. On this conception of a decomposition it is thus ineligible to be a 
thought-element.
!us Frege’s insistence that Sid, e.g., can be no thought-element. A thought’s truth 
might turn on how Sid is. But Sid cannot make himself, or anything else, that on which the 
truth of any given thought turns; nor make truth turn on whether anything is any given way. 
Sid, as opposed to whether things that matter smoke, is not even a partial question of truth. 
(Similarly for Mont Blanc and !e True.) Sid and being such as to smoke are equally, and for 
the same reasons, ineligible to be thought-elements.
!e second point about thought-elements is that the same thought may be 
decomposed in many ways, where what is an element on one decomposition may be absent 
from another. What a thought’s elements are is thus relative to how it is decomposed. To be 
such an element is, more properly, to be an element of some decomposition(s) of the 
thought. (See, e.g., (1892: 199-200.)) Casitas follow suit here too. !ere are many ways of 
decomposing a casita’s outer surface into surface-parts; correspondingly many (at least) of 
dividing up a task of whitewashing it. None can claim serious priority per se. So, too, Frege 
tells us, for di"erent decompositions of the same thought. (See 1882: 118.)
Where a thought is decomposed into, inter alia, an element which makes truth turn 
(somehow) on which things are some given way, or which way relevant objects must be, I 
will call the element predicative. Where an element makes such-and-such object the one 
which must be relevant ways, I will call it a naming element.
A third point. A thought has a mission, decomposable into subtasks, just as 
whitewashing a casita is decomposable into subtasks. But there is a di"erence. A subtask in 
whitewashing might be done on its own. Pia whitewashes the front façade. Sid, charged with 
the rear, instead sneaks o" for a nap. !e casita has not been whitewashed. But at least 
something has been done. It has been partially whitewashed. !ere is no parallel in a task of 
making truth turn on how things are. Subtasks in doing so cannot be parcelled out. More 
crucially, there is no such thing as doing just one such subtask (and then, as it were, 
stopping). !ere is no making truth turn in part on how Sid is independent of making truth 
turn on how things are; no such thing as taking satisfaction in a job part done. Here to stop 
short of the whole job would be to do nothing. Such is one form of Frege’s context principle.
1.2. Bedeutung: 1891 marks a watershed in Frege’s thought. It is the point by which he had 
abandoned the notion judgeable content as un#t for purpose. He broke o" from this what had 
no role in identifying questions of truth. What remained was Sinn, in the varieties whole 
thought and thought-element. What was broken o" he called ‘Bedeutung’. What was le$ 
behind retained this feature: the whole comes #rst; parts of it are arrived at by 
decomposition. A key question: Does the same apply to what was broken o"?
Frege describes the breakup as follows:
When I wrote my Foundations of Arithmetic I had not yet made the 
distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, and thus still brought 
together in the notion judgeable content what I now designate 
di"erentially with the words ‘thought’ and ‘truth value’. (1892: 198)
Truth value appears here as the prime case of what needed breaking o". It thus appears as 
what is most central to Frege’s notion of Bedeutung that a truth-value is the Bedeutung of a 
whole thought. !e problem of what the Bedeutungen of Sinne of various kinds are is o$en 
approached as follows: we know that the Bedeutung of a naming thought-element is an 
object. In that case, what should the Bedeutungen of other sorts of Sinne be? !is makes for 
particular problems when it comes to the Bedeutung of a whole thought. Frege himself 
sometimes encourages this way of thinking. One might be further encouraged if he reads 
‘bedeuten’ in Frege’s mouth as roughly ‘denote’, or ‘refer’, and then consults his own intuitions 
about denoting to see what, if anything, one might say a whole thought to name. But the 
problems thus raised are needless, or idle. To see what Frege’s notion of Bedeutung is, we 
ought to proceed the other way around. For this notion, it is a given that the Bedeutung of a 
whole thought is a truth-value. What, then, ought the Bedeutungen of other elements to be?
To begin with, why does truth-value need to be excised from judgeable content? A 
simple answer: there are no two thoughts which are distinguished from each other precisely 
in the one being true, the other false. !ere are not, e.g., two thoughts, the true one that Sid 
smokes and the false one that he does. Being true, or false, is thus not part of precisely that by 
which truth can come into question at all.
A more complicated answer: having the truth-value it does cannot be part of what 
identi#es a thought (or its question of truth) as the one it is. Truth cannot belong to what 
brings itself in question. Otherwise it would not be #xed what thought was at issue until it 
was #xed whether what was in question was a true thought or a false one. In a thought, 
something is represented as being something: the way things are as being some way there is 
for things to be (e.g., such that Sid smokes). Truth now enters the picture with the question 
whether things are as thus represented. A thought is identi#ed by what is thus variable: the 
second factor. Where truth belonged to bringing itself into question, how a thought 
represented things as being would not be #xed until it was #xed whether such was 
representing truly. But such reduces the behaviour of a thought, and of representing-as, to the 
behaviour of something else entirely: factive meaning, or (where falsity plays the identifying 
role) factive counter-meaning. Factive meaning leaves no room for the question whether 
things are as represented: if not, then they simply were not so represented. Representing-as, 
so truth, would thus be abolished.
Still, truth matters. “Laws of logic”, Frege tells us, “are in the #rst place laws in the 
realm of Bedeutung, and only mediately pertain to Sinn.” (1892-1895: 133) At the least, logic’s 
central concern is truth-preservation. But there is talk of truth being preserved or not only 
where whatever it is that would #x a truth-value can be supposed to have done its work. For a 
thought to #x what it is meant to, some determinate question of truth, is for it to make truth 
turn in some determinate way on how things are (normally, perhaps not necessarily, a way 
which makes how things are matter. To assign a thought a truth-value is to suppose the way 
things are to have delivered an answer to the question thus posed; for truth to have turned in 
that way, how things are then delivering a given outcome. So, we might say, for a given 
thought to have a given truth-value is for the way things are to have delivered that answer to 
the question posed. So, substituting ‘the world’ for ‘how things are’, for the truth-value to be 
the Bedeutung of the thought is for it to be the world’s answer to the question posed.
One might thus think of the Bedeutung of a thought as being ‘!e True’, or ‘!e False’ 
in the same way one thinks of ‘Yes’ as being the answer to a yes-no question. As Frege points 
out, the content of such a ‘Yes’ is really the content of the question: both express, or contain, 
the same thought. We could thus think of the Bedeutung of the thought that Sid smokes as the 
answer to that question being ‘True’.
From this starting point we now approach the question what the Bedeutungen of 
thought-elements would be. !e obvious answer: a thought-element makes the thought’s 
truth turn in part in such-and-such way on how things are; the Bedeutung of such an element 
should then be the answer to the thought’s question of truth, insofar as this is settled by that 
element (so by that partial way of turning) and things being as they are. Suppose, e.g., that a 
predicative element in the thought that Sid smokes makes truth turn on whether relevant 
things smoke. Speaking loosely, objects divide into those which smoke and those which do 
not. How the objects there are thus divide depends, of course, on how things are. It is part of 
the world’s answer to a question which makes truth turn in the way just mentioned on how 
things are. !is partial answer can be registered as follows. Consider that function which (as 
it happens) maps an object onto !e True just in case that object is a smoker; onto !e False 
otherwise. !en the answer to the thought’s question is: the truth-value of the whole is the 
values of that function for relevant arguments. !e relevant Bedeutung-element would thus 
be: (the answer) being those values of that function. Similarly, a naming element in that 
thought which made truth turn on how Sid is would have as its Bedeutung (the answer) being 
the value of the relevant function (as determined by other elements) for the argument Sid.
We thus arrive at a notion, Bedeutung-element. For each thought-element (on a 
decomposition) there is a corresponding Bedeutung-element. !e sort of element this is is 
determined by the sort of thought-element to which it corresponds. A whole Bedeutung (a 
truth-value, considered as answer) decomposes into Bedeutung-elements. For each 
decomposition of the whole thought, it does this in a corresponding way. So, as with 
thoughts, the basic notion is decomposing on a decomposition.
Our general principle about decompositions (of white-washings, of pecan pies, of 
whatever)—that principle which lost us the problem of forming ‘unities’ out of elements—
now applies: one has a decomposition of a whole Bedeutung just where the Bedeutung-
elements are, jointly, the whole answer to the question posed. Because of this, a function 
from objects to truth-values is ineligible for being a Bedeutung-element of (or #xed by) a 
predicative thought-element (and the world). Such functions, and some object they map into 
a truth value, simply form a list. !e problem of unity arises.
We can, though, introduce a new notion; that of what I will call an ingredient (of an 
element). An ingredient of a thought-element is to be that on which it makes truth turn, and 
by which it is distinguished from other elements of its type as the particular element of that 
type which it is. For example, a predicative element makes truth turn on which things are 
some particular way for a thing to be. It is identi#ed as the predicative element it is by the way 
in question for a thing to be—e.g., that that way is, being such as to smoke. !at way for 
things to be is thus an ingredient in that element. Similarly, a naming element makes truth 
turn, say, on how Sid is, thus distinguishing itself from other naming elements (though, if 
there are many ways of making truth turn on how Sid is, then not from all such). Sid might 
thus count as an ingredient of that naming element. Similarly, a predicative Bedeutung-
element makes it a particular function from objects to truth-values which is the one whose 
value for relevant arguments is the answer to the whole thought’s question. So such a 
function might be counted as an ingredient of this Bedeutung-element. (Here, too, di"erent 
predicative elements might each #x a Bedeutung-element with the same ingredient.)
!is notion of ingredient does not #x a unique ingredient for every element. Choices 
between candidates, were such arise, are to be made as is then convenient. !e immediate 
point is just to point to something it might mean to call a function from objects to truth-
values the Bedeutung of a predicative element. Bedeutung-elements need not be what Frege 
meant by Bedeutungen. Nor, given the choices now on the table, need Frege have been 
perfectly clear as to what he did mean by ‘Bedeutung’. !e primary object of the present 
exercise is to identify various di"erent things for which Frege’s obstacle might, or might not, 
arise. We are now halfway.
1.3. Concepts (First Notion): What Frege’s obstacle concerns, he tells us, is ‘concepts’, or talk 
thereof. What, though, might a concept be? Two notions of a concept emerge from the roles 
to which Frege puts the term in identifying those structures to which logic must be sensitive. 
!is section develops one of these. !e need to be served is this: there must be a way for a 
thought to make truth turn on how relevant objects are other than by specifying which 
objects these are to be. Frege illustrates this need, and its being served, as follows:
One must not think that I say something about an inner-African 
chie$ain, entirely unknown to me, if I say, “All men are mortal’. I speak 
neither of this one, or of that one; but I subordinate the concept man to 
the concept mortal. … Nor must one think that the Sinn of the 
sentence ‘Cato is mortal’ is contained in the sentence ‘All men are 
mortal’, so that should I utter [this last] I will have, in the same stroke, 
expressed the thought content of [this #rst]. !e matter is much more 
as follows. In the sentence ‘All men are mortal’, I say, ‘If something is a 
man, it is mortal.’ By an inferential move from the general to the 
particular, I get from this the sentence ‘If Cato is a man, then Cato is 
mortal.’ Now I still need a second premise, namely, ‘Cato is a man’. 
From these two premises I conclude, ‘Cato is mortal.’ (1914: 231)
Suppose that ‘All men’, or ‘men’ in it, functioned as a name (albeit, perhaps, a highly 
polysemous one): it speci#ed on the mortality or not of which objects the truth of the 
thought expressed depended. !en it would name, inter alia, Cato. !at is, it would make 
truth turn, inter alia, on how Cato was, speci#cally, whether mortal. !e truth of the whole 
thought would thus require Cato to be. Suppose, then, that we assume (or assert) its truth. It 
follows immediately from our assumption that Cato is mortal. So the inference from ‘All men 
are mortal’ to ‘Cato is’ should be immediate. It should depend on no further premiss. No 
more is required than the truth of our assumption for that Cato is mortal to be true too. Such 
is obviously not the case. For it to follow that Cato is mortal, something else must be so: that 
Cato is a man. Such demonstrates the need for a di"erent way for a thought’s truth to depend 
on who is mortal.
Frege also sketches what this other way would have to be. It would have to be a way of 
involving all objects meeting a certain condition. A concept, on our #rst notion, is what plays 
a certain role in achieving this. !e crucial things about a concept so conceived is expressed 
by Frege thus:
What I see as the essential thing for a concept is that the question 
whether something falls under it has a sense. (1882: 118)
As one might think of a concept, the core of the notion is a way for a thing to be. (Such is the 
simplest case. !e core generalises to a way for an n-tuple of objects to be, n ≥ 1. It also 
generalises to a way for things (read catholically): a way which, indi"erently, any n-tuple of 
objects is as much as any other (e.g., such that Sid smokes). One might think of this as the 
case n = 0.) For any way for a thing to be, let there be the concept of a thing so being. For an 
object to fall under such a concept can just be for it to be the relevant way. Such gives a sense 
to the question whether an object falls under it, asked of a concept in present sense.
Such a concept #gures as follows in the envisioned non-naming way of making truth 
turn on how relevant objects are. It (or, equally, that which it is of) may be put to work as an 
ingredient in a predicative thought element. But, in the context of the whole thought that 
predicative element would be working in a special way: not such that for things to be as 
represented would be for the right things to be that way; but rather such that whatever was 
that way was also relevant other ways (ingredients in other predicative elements playing 
di"erent roles in the whole thought so decomposed).
!is notion of a concept allows concepts a certain object-independence. What fell 
under a concept could be other than what does. No given object must fall under a concept for 
the concept to exist, or be the one it is. Nothing need fall under a concept for there to be one. 
If just one thing does so, the concept might still be object-independent in all the above ways. 
Not all concepts have all these features. !ere is the concept of being that very philosopher, 
Frege. But for Frege’s existence there would have been no such concept. Since there is, 
nothing other than what falls under it could have done so no matter what. Similarly, being a 
whale is a way for a thing to be. But it might not have had there been no whales. What is built 
into this notion of a concept is just that such forms of object-independence are provided for.
A concept1 may be called true of what falls under it, but not true outright. Nor does it 
represent what falls under it as that which it is a concept of. !e concept1 of being a smoker is 
what requires something for Sid to fall under it. It is indi"erent to whether he meets that 
requirement. It is subject to no standard of correctness, or accuracy, which it may meet or fail 
to according to whether Sid smokes. It is in no business for which there might be such a 
standard of success—no business such as representing-as would be. Its indi"erence to 
whether Sid falls under it is part of its indi"erence to whether Sid exists.
!is is to say that a concept1 is not a predicative thought element. It does not make 
truth turn, even in part, on anything. It might be counted as an ingredient of such an 
element; that which the element puts to work as what relevant things need to be (or fall 
under). Or, again, one might rather count that which the concept is a concept of (in the 
unary case, a way for a thing to be) as the ingredient. Such is a matter of indi"erence just 
where one does not distinguish—as Frege sometimes does not—between a thought of 
something being thus and so and one of its falling under the concept of things so being. In 
any case, being an ingredient does not make something Sinn. Sid can be counted as an 
ingredient of a naming thought-element. He is put to work there as what truth turns on in 
the relevant way (what must be relevant ways). But Sid is certainly not a Sinn. One might 
equally see the ingredient in the naming element as a concept of a special kind: a concept of 
being that very thing, Sid. Such a concept, of course, requires Sid for its existence, and allows 
nothing but Sid to fall under it. Whether such a concept or Sid is an ingredient may cease to 
be a matter of indi"erence, notably, where one is concerned with the possibility of many 
concepts with the above two mentioned features—where one recognises many ways of 
making Sid the one on whom truth turns. If neither objects nor concepts1 are Sinne, nor are 
they Bedeutung-elements, though objects, at least, may be ingredients thereof. Whether this 
would make an object a Bedeutung rests on a decision as to how to use that term. (Frege’s 
usage suggests the answer yes; though whether it requires this depends on how that usage is 
to be explained.)
1.4. Concepts (Second Notion): Our second conception of a concept (a concept2) also 
derives from Frege’s perception of the needs of logic (or, this time, of a logical notation). To 
introduce the notion I will begin, as Frege does, with language. Frege suggests (e.g., 
(1892-1895: 130), (1897: 154)) that for logic’s purposes the grammatical distinction of 
subject and predicate should be eschewed, in favour of a distinction parallel to that in 
mathematics between function and argument. !ere is a grammatical notion of subject and 
predicate; and there is a logical notion of naming and predication. !e logical notion of 
predication is already in play here in the idea of a predicative thought-element: predication 
(in the unary case) is making truth turn on a way for a thing to be. !e idea is: these two 
notions come apart.
In the simplest cases—words such as ‘Sid smokes’—grammar and logic coincide. Here 
‘_ smokes’ is the grammatical predicate: it forms a sentence with what is grammatically a 
name (or, more properly, a noun phrase); and in the expression of a thought it is responsible 
for identifying a predicative thought-element in the thought thus presented as 
decomposed—a thought element which makes truth turn on whether the right people smoke.
!e logical notion, predicative element, though, generalises from this simple case to 
something which corresponds to nothing a grammar of a language need recognise. !e 
linguistic correlate of this generalised notion is an open sentence. An open sentence is what 
is derived from a complete one by erasing one or more noun phrases (grammatically naming 
elements) from it, leaving blank spaces behind. In an expression of a thought, an open 
sentence with n blanks would identify an n-ary predicative thought-element (to be found in 
the thought expressed suitably decomposed). !is would make truth turn on whether 
relevant n-tuples were a given way for an n-tuple to be. Where the whole thought-expressing 
sentence results from the open one by #lling each blank with a (grammatical) name, the 
relevant n-tuple for truth of the whole would be formed of the objects named in those 
#llings.
Our second notion of a concept enters the picture here as the answer to the question 
what an open sentence denotes. !e idea will be: a concept2  is what an open sentence, in the 
context of a whole one, in the context of its use to express a thought denotes. But this answer 
is meant to derive from a more general answer to the question what an open sentence 
denotes as such. !e answer to this further question is: a function (where a function is what 
relates one domain of objects, its arguments, to another, its values, such that for each 
argument there is exactly one value). In 1904, Frege tells the following story about this (for 
double-open sentences). Consider the open sentence, ‘__ = sin __’. We can understand this 
sentence as identifying, or denoting, a certain function (here, the sine function). So to 
understand it is to understand it as telling us, for any #lling of the last blank (by a number) 
what is to go in the le$ blank: understanding this last #lling as presenting an argument of the 
sine function, what value to put into the #rst blank. So, for example, 0 on the right would call 
for 1 on the le$, pi/2 would call for 0. !e #llings, ‘0’, ‘1’, etc., denote numbers. Similarly, the 
open sentence should, here, denote a function. To #nd that function ask what remains 
constant as the #llings vary. What remains constant is what so relates all the #llings: just that 
mapping which maps 0 onto 1, pi/2 onto 0 and so on. Such, then, is what the open sentence, 
so understood, denotes.
Suppose, now, that we consider the open sentence, ‘__ smokes’. If we #ll the blank with 
‘Sid’ we get a truth. If we #ll it with ‘Di’ we get a falsehood, and so on. Frege’s notion of 
Bedeutung begins from the idea that the Bedeutung of a whole thought is a truth-value. We 
can, then, understand ‘__ smokes’ (at least in the context of the expression of a thought) as 
denoting a function. For a given #lling of the blank as that function’s argument, its value 
would be the Bedeutung of the whole thus formed: a truth-value. !e function would be what 
remained constant as <#lling, whole-Bedeutung> pairs remained constant. On the model of 
‘__ = sin __’, this constant would be that mapping which mapped just those arguments into 
just those values.
!ere are the obvious di"erences between the two cases. Where ‘__ sin __’ is 
understood as denoting the sine function, the value of the function denoted is to be 
understood to be the #lling of the #rst blank. If we view ‘__ smokes’ as denoting a function, 
there is no place in the open sentence for a value. What would denote the relevant function 
on the understanding on which ‘__ sin __’ denotes the sine function, one would need an 
expression like ‘__ = __ smokes’ (in another style, ‘y = smokes (x)’. Conversely, ‘__ = sin __’, 
blanks #lled, may also be understood as the expression of a thought, as in the expression of 
the false thought, ‘17 = sin 2’. !e function thus denoted would be one from pairs of numbers 
to truth values, with no place in the open sentence for the value this function takes. To 
denote this function in the style of ‘__ = sin __’, one would need something like ‘z = sin(x,y)’. 
Perhaps the best approach here is to suppose that there are two relevant understandings of an 
open sentence, on each of which it denotes a function (though di"erent ones on each). !ere 
is an understanding on which the value of the function is supposed to be mentioned in some 
blank in the open sentence, and an understanding where it is to be understood as the 
denotation (or Bedeutung) of a #lled whole. Typically (but not necessarily) it is on the second 
understanding that an open sentence denotes a concept2. For a concept2 just is to be a 
mapping from (n-tuples of) objects to truth-values.
A concept2  is a mapping. !ough Frege tells us that we cannot really speak of being 
identical with some given concept, if we keep that in mind, we can say this: 
What two concept-words bedeuten is the same if, and only if, the 
concept-extensions belonging to them coincide. (1892-1895: 133)
So if we were to speak of concepts2 as identical to, or distinct from, one another—if we were 
permitted to engage in such talk—we would know exactly how to go about it. A mapping is 
what a mapping does. For each mapping, there is what it maps into what. Whatever maps 
that into that is that mapping; whatever does not is not. concepts2 are mappings. !us, so it is 
with concepts2.
One might argue as to whether the sine function ‘ought to be’ a mapping in above 
sense, or whether it is, rather, that ‘law’ which determines what is to be mapped into what. 
One might similarly argue as to whether a concept ‘ought to be’ a mapping in this sense, or, 
again, ought to be that which #xes which mapping is to bear some given title. !e present 
position is that ‘concept’ lacks determinate enough content to give such questions an answer 
outright. !ey are not sensible questions until it has been decided what role a concept is to be 
assigned. As it happens, concept2, conceived as mappings, are perfectly suited to serve as 
ingredients in predicative Bedeutung-elements. A mapping from objects to truth-values 
which takes on the value true precisely for the smokers registers precisely the world’s answer 
to the question whether Sid smokes—what in fact happens when truth so turns—insofar as 
what that answer is is determined by the fact that the thought in question is as to some given 
thing being this way: such as to smoke. It’s answer to that whole question is precisely the 
value into which this mapping maps the argument Sid.
Concepts2 are intrinsically object-dependent in precisely the way in which concepts1 
are not. For a concept2 (a mapping) to exist, and for it to be the one it is, is for it to map just 
these arguments into these values. Its existence depends on there being just these pairs of 
objects. Whereas a concept1 may exist, be what it is, entirely independent of what objects (if 
any) fall under it. (Some concepts1 do; some do not.) We might think of a concept1 as 
denoting a concept2: where a concept1 is of some given way for a thing to be, it denotes that 
concept2  which maps just those things into true which are that way. But such denotation 
would not be rigid. A bit less irony in the parent-child communication mix and Sid might 
have grown up non-smoker. !e concept1 being a smoker (the same for all that) would then 
have denoted a di"erent  concept2. Object-independence—the very point of concepts1—
would defeat the whole point of concepts2. !ese would no longer register the world’s 
answers to those questions thoughts pose.
In 1882 Frege speaks of a concept as what cannot have an independent existence, but 
“arises only through the decomposition of judgeable contents”. (1882: 118). !ere, and from 
thenceforth he also speaks of concepts as unsaturated:
A concept is unsaturated, in that it requires something of what falls 
under it; thus it cannot exist on its own. (1882: 118)
!e #rst remark suggests that what the existence of a concept is dependent on is (in 
post-1891 terms) whole thoughts. !e second suggests that its existence is somehow or other 
dependent on objects.
!e #rst idea might be developed on these lines. For a concept to exist is for it to play a 
certain role (so for there to be precisely that role to be played) in whole thoughts; thus, for 
there to be a certain contribution to be made to making truth turn on how things are as given 
thoughts make truth thus turn. For there to be such a thing as a concept of being a smoker, 
there must be such a thing as making truth turn on who smokes—a thing which can only be 
done in the context of making truth turn, full stop, in some way or other on how things are. 
So there is no concept of being a smoker unless there are whole thoughts whose truth turns 
in one way or another on who smokes. One might also put this: for there to be a concept of 
being a smoker, there must be such a thing as its being true, or false, of things. But this 
presupposes there being such a thing as truth outright. !us, whole thoughts #rst.
As for the second idea, what is intrinsic to a concept, for Frege, is precisely not that 
things must fall under it, but certainly that it requires things of what does. One might 
understand this as it requiring things which either fall under it or do not. For a concept1 this 
idea might be developed on these lines. It is intrinsic to a way for a thing to be (so to a 
concept1 thereof) to be general: being that way is something which, if possible at all, would 
be shared in common in inde#nitely many cases of an object’s being as it was. Equally for not 
being that way. But there cannot be something in common to ranges of cases unless there are 
cases for it to be common to—here, at the least, present in or absent from. In the case of a 
unary concept, such would be cases of an object’s being as it is. So the existence of a concept1 
would be dependent on the existence of objects in this way: for there to be such a thing as the 
concept1 of being a smoker, there must be objects which, in being as they are, either 
exemplify a thing’s so being, or exemplify a thing’s not. (Of course, in this sense of 
dependence, there is no reason to expect the existence of an object not to be equally 
dependent on the existence of concepts1. !e thing about an object is that it is one item 
which, inevitably, will fall under countless concepts1. Take away the concepts, and there is 
nothing le$ of the objects either.)
In the event, later on (e.g., 1904) Frege inclines towards introducing the notion of 
unsaturation in the #rst instance as a notion applying to open sentences. Derivatively, it is 
also to be a feature of what open sentences denote. Which means, #rst, that it is a notion 
which applies to functions, and equally to all functions, not just ones which are concepts2, 
but second, in what ever way it applies to functions, it eo ipso applies in just that way to 
concepts2, which, among concepts, are the most immediate candidates for its application. An 
open sentence di"ers from the noun phrases eligible to #ll its blanks, #rst, in that it need not 
belong to any grammatically signi#cant category at all—it need not be any (grammatically) 
proper part of a sentence; second, in that, while, grammatically speaking, its blanks may be 
#lled by noun phrases (or names), it is not eligible to #ll the blanks in anything (construing 
#lling blanks as restoring what is incomplete as an open sentence is to complete status); third, 
that, through its blank spaces, it determines just where completion would be needed to 
restore wholeness.
!ese three features identify a notion of grammatical unsaturation. An open sentence 
can predicate (express a predicative thought-element) only where occurring as completed: 
there is a predicative thought-element only where a whole thought has been expressed. 
Equally, and for just the same reason, a noun phrase can name (express a naming thought-
element) only where a whole thought has been expressed. But a noun phrase (a potential 
name) contains nothing in it to #x just how it may be completed (grammatically). It might be 
completed by any open sentence, whether belonging to a grammatical category or not, and, if 
this is n times open, then by it together with from 0 to n-1 other names, distributed in 
whatever pattern into its blank spaces. (!is brackets issues of categorial restrictions on 
predication, e.g., predicating being blue of the score of the United-Sporting game.) As one 
might put this, an open sentence is, as a noun phrase is not, quite speci#c about its 
Ergänzungsbedür!igkeit.
Frege extends the notion of unsaturation to denotata of unsaturated expressions:
!at peculiarity of the function-sign which we have called unsaturation 
naturally corresponds to something in functions themselves. !is too 
we can call unsaturation, and thus distinguish them as fundamentally 
di"erent from numbers. (1904: 665)
But he is at best frugal with his explanation of how the extension goes. If the denotata are just 
functions, one might see unsaturation in their very object-dependence. A function 
(mapping) is what remains constant (in denotation) across all variation in what #lls the blank 
spaces (on that understanding of an open sentence, above, on which it identi#es a function). 
It is that very same thing which, in each case, maps that argument into that value; the same 
thing for each pair of argument and value. Of course, there is no such same thing without the 
arguments and values which get mapped. In that sense what Frege said of concepts in 1882 is 
so of functions in general: they cannot exist independent of objects. Concepts2 are 
unsaturated in this sense.
II
2.1. Predicative Nature: Part I developed a set of di"erent things there may be an obstacle to 
speaking of. Each of these develops a di"erent strand in Frege’s thought. It was claimed of 
none that it is what Frege meant by the term such-and-such. Nor is it claimed that our two 
notions of concept are necessarily concepts of di"erent things. For all it matters here, Frege 
may just not have seen these di"erent things to choose between. In any event, insofar as 
Frege tries to explain why there should be an obstacle, he o"ers two suggestions. One is: that 
for which there is an obstacle has something called ‘predicative nature’; predicating things of 
it as though it were an object is inconsistent with this nature. !e other is: the obstacle arises 
for what it does because this is unsaturated. !ese diagnoses are clearly di"erent. All 
functions are unsaturated. So, if this is the source of the obstacle, then it arises for functions 
in general, not just ones from objects to truth-values. !ere are various things ‘predicative 
nature’ might mean. But in any case it seems clear that this is something not all functions 
have. !ere is, it seems, nothing intrinsically predicative about the sine function. In fact, I 
will suggest, neither diagnosis is very promising. !is section takes up the #rst.
Having predicative nature needs di"erent understandings for our di"erent candidates 
for the obstacle’s object. A predicative thought-element has such a nature in that for it to be is 
for it to be making truth turn (somehow) on what is, what not, some given way for things to 
be (in some particular decomposition of some given thought); for its contribution to 
representing things (catholically read) as some given way to be representing the relevant 
things (plural of ‘thing’) as some given way—to predicate such-and-such of these things. A 
predicative Bedeutung-element is predicative in that it registers the world’s answer to a given 
thought’s question of truth insofar as this question is #xed by the predicative thought-
element to which it corresponds. A concept1 has a predicative nature in that it is something 
#t for service as an ingredient in predicative thought-elements—it provides something for 
such elements to make truth to turn on. A concept2 has predicative nature in that it registers 
the outcome of truth turning as some predicative thought-element makes it turn on how 
things are.
So, it seems, in the having of predicative nature there is something fundamental about 
predicative thought-elements. Let us start with them. To be a predicative element is, per se, to 
be doing a certain sort of work: to make the truth of some thought, on some decomposition 
of it, turn in part on which things are some given way for things to be. For any given such 
element, there is no such thing as being that element without doing that work, or being that 
element while doing other work for a thought-element to do. A predicative element could 
not, e.g., take the place of a naming element in any decomposition of any thought. !ere is 
just no such thing as that.
!is is so on two understandings of being a predicative element. It is trivially so if a 
thought-element just is an element of a particular decomposition of a particular thought. 
!en any element in any other decomposition, or any decomposition of any thought, is not 
it. Nor is any other element in the decomposition it belongs to. But instead of understanding 
an element as the doing of such-and-such in a particular thought’s making truth to turn as 
that thought makes it do, we can also think of an element as something there is to be done in 
a thought in its making truth turn as it does. To decompose a thought into, inter alia, a given 
predicative element is to bring it under a certain generality; to represent its way of making 
truth turn on things as a way of a certain kind; if there is such a kind, then there is, per se, a 
range of thoughts, each of which, in its own way, is of that kind. A predicative element, on 
this second understanding, is what is in common to all of these. On this understanding, too, 
to be a given element is to be the doing of given work (here understood just as something to 
be done). For no other thought element can the doing of this work be the doing of that 
other’s. It thus remains so that no predicative element can replace (‘vertreten’) a naming 
element in any thought whatever.
Such corresponds to something Frege says about the fundamental di"erence he sees 
between ‘concepts’ and ‘objects’—that di"erence which makes for the obstacle: that objects 
and concepts cannot take each other’s place. If this were to mean that predicative and naming 
thought-elements cannot take each other’s place, then indeed not. !is, though, is irrelevant 
to the question whether there could be a thought about a predicative thought-element in 
which that element played the role of an object—one of being, or not, various ways there are 
for an object to be. For if there were such a thought about a predicative thought-element, that 
element need be no element in that thought. Not a predicative element, since the point is not 
to predicate of that element what it predicates of something. Nor a naming-element. A 
naming element in such a thought would make truth turn on how that predicative thought-
element was. Of course that predicative element, in the nature of the case, would not make 
truth turn on itself as truth might turn on some object.
!e question, though, is rather whether there could be a naming element in some 
thought which made truth turn on which ways that predicative element was—otherwise put, 
whether a predicative thought-element in one thought might be an ingredient in a naming 
thought-element in another. !e core fact here is that the doing of one thing cannot be the 
doing of another, so that no predicative thought-element is any naming thought-element, nor 
vice-versa. Such does not answer this question. No reason is yet in evidence why truth cannot 
be made to turn on what is so of, e.g., making truth turn on who smokes. !at a predicative 
thought-element can never be exchanged for an element of another sort (in any 
decomposition of anything) is not, so far as it goes, a route to, or source of, the obstacle.
Such is not the end of the story. For Frege suggests another reason why no concept 
could ever be an ingredient of a naming element. It is this:
Objects and concepts are fundamentally di"erent, and cannot take 
each other’s place. … Concepts cannot stand in the same relations as 
objects. To think them so to stand would be, not false, but impossible. 
(1892-1895: 130)
!e suggestion is: one simply cannot predicate the same thing of a concept and an object. 
Objects form a category. !ere is what is essential for membership: that the question whether 
something is that very thing (is identical with it) makes sense. !ere is then what is 
predicable  of what satis#es this condition. What is predicable of this is predicable of just this. 
Concepts form a category. !ere is, again, what is essential for membership: that the question 
what falls under it (a member) makes sense. !ere is what is predicable of what falls in this 
category. Again, what is predicable of this is predicable of only this.
Suppose, now, that what Frege suggests about concepts here were so of predicative 
thought-elements. Now suppose that A is an ingredient of some naming-element in a 
decomposition of some thought. It is thus treatable as an object. So what is predicable of it is 
what is predicable of objects. So the question what is identical with it makes sense. But, on 
the present suggestion about predicative thought-elements, the question, for any thought-
element whether A is identical with it makes no sense. For predicative thought-elements, on 
present assumption, belong to a di"erent category. So there is nothing it would be, for any 
predicative thought-element, and for any ingredient in a naming thought-element, for these 
to be one. In which case there would be an obstacle of the sort Frege sees to treating concepts 
as objects.
Similarly for our other obstacle candidates. Many objects are un#tted for service as an 
ingredient in a predicative thought-element. My friend Guy is. So is the apple in his hand. So 
are all his kin. So is the smoke point of peanut oil, or the divorce rate in Brazil. Guy is not a 
way for truth to turn on how an object is. Nor, equally, an apple. Nor that smoke point. Being 
Guy, or being an apple, is another story. !ese are (as Guy himself is not) ways for a thing to 
be. Truth may then turn on which things are those ways. So there is what is #t for predicative 
service and what is not. Where there is what is so #t, there is also the concept1 of it. One may 
ask of these whether anything thus #t for predicative service, or any concept1 thereof might 
also be #t for service as an ingredient in a naming thought-element. !at ever so many things 
#t for such ‘naming’ service are un#t for predicative service simply fails to answer the 
question. What might force a negative answer on us? Frege’s idea would if what he says about 
concepts applied to ways for things to be, or to concepts1. It is hard to see what else might.
Similarly again for concepts2. Can it really be that a mapping from objects to truth-
values could not be an ingredient in a naming element in any thought whatever? What, e.g., 
of the thought expressed in, ‘!e mapping which maps Pia and Sid into true, all other objects 
into false, is the denotation of any concept1 under which precisely and only the present 
author’s favourite couple fall’? It is hard to see what might force a negative answer on us here 
unless, of course, what Frege says about concepts above holds of mappings from objects to 
truth values. In which case the above argument repeats itself for conceptss.
All this gives us so far, though, is: if what Frege says about concepts and objects were 
true of any of our candidates, then we would face the obstacle he sees to speaking of that 
candidate. But is what Frege says right of any of our candidates, or anything else with 
‘predicative nature’? Nothing in what predicative nature is, or might be, seems to show this. 
!ough our search for what would show it is not yet over, we might now note two counter-
indications.
!e #rst is this. If Frege is right, then concepts (whatever these are) cannot serve as 
ingredients in naming elements. Suppose we overlooked this and tried to speak so as to put 
them in such service. What would happen? How would our attempt founder? !e crucial fact 
is: we would not be able to say of anything that it was identical with any concept. Such would, 
indeed, lead to grief. But it is not as if the trouble would be that, if we could make such 
statements, we would not know when to count what was said in them as true. Suppose, e.g., 
that concepts are concepts2. We know exactly when to say (if only it could be said) when 
anything is a given concept2. It is so when it maps just those things the concept does into just 
those truth-values it does. As for concepts1, we are in no more di'culty about when to say 
something is a given concept1 than we are as to when to say something is a given way for a 
thing to be; and there is no more di'culty as to that than there is as to ever identifying what 
it is that was said where something was. Mutatis mutandis for predicative thought-elements, 
and for predicative Bedeutung-elements.
If we follow later Wittgenstein, then what has just been said demonstrates that Frege 
was wrong about the obstacle. For, on his view, there is nothing it might be for a would-be 
identity statement to fail to be truth-evaluable, so to fail to make sense, except for us to #nd it 
“to stupid, or complicated, or something of the sort” so to regard it. (Investigations §136) 
What we are able to treat a truth-evaluable, the idea is, is so.
For Wittgenstein, the story ends there. But not for us. !ere is, though, a second point 
to keep in mind. If the distinction between objects and concepts is categorial in the way 
described, then, though one cannot predicate of a concept what one can predicate of an 
object, all the same there is what one can predicate of a concept. But there is no predicating 
anything of anything unless the subject of the predication participates in a relation which 
satis#es something of the form of Leibniz’ law, applied to things of the category to which this 
subject belongs. !e point about objects and identity is that there is no making sense of an 
object’s having any property without supposing it to be re-encounterable: the very thing 
which is F also being that thing which is G, fails to be H, and so on; (as Frege insists) its 
being F (if so it is) being subject to joint investigation, and the object of stances by, di"erent 
thinkers. Such a demand would apply equally, and for the same reasons, to concepts if, like 
objects, they have properties, whether or not of categorially di"erent types. One could refuse 
to call the requisite ‘Lebniz’ law’ relation between concepts ‘identity’. Call it ‘shmidentity’ if 
you like, and insist that this is not identity. !ere is surely an air of whimsy in all this. Such, 
though, does not end the story.
2.2. Unsaturation: Unsaturation is a property of all functions, not just those special ones, 
from objects to truth-values, which Frege (post-1891) calls concepts. !e question is whether 
some unsaturated things might sometimes serve as objects. ‘Serve as’, here, means serve as 
ingredients in naming elements—ones which make truth turn, somehow, on how such-and-
such object is. It is assumed here that nothing can ever serve as an object unless questions 
whether such-and-such is identical with (that very thing,) it make sense, further (o$en 
enough) have answers. As we have seen, if this were the only hurdle to be passed, then 
nothing would bar functions from such service. If, however, unsaturation bars something 
from such service, then no function can so serve. So, e.g., if a mathematican were to say, ‘Let 
F be that function which maps each integer from 1-500 into its double, each integer from 
501-1000 into its quadruple, all other integers into themselves’, he would not actually have 
speci#ed a function—a bit of an embarrassment.
It is perhaps for this reason that Frege sometimes modi#es his stand on just what 
obstacle is posed to so speaking of a concept. In 1914, for example, when speaking of the role 
of logic in mathematics, he says,
We say, ‘!e function’, and ‘the concept’, expressions which are hardly 
avoidable, and yet are un#t for purpose. !e de#nite article gives these 
expressions the form of a proper name in the logical sense, as though 
they designated objects; precisely what they are not supposed to be 
doing here. !e very essence of concepts, and of functions, 
unsaturation, is thereby concealed. Language presses us into an 
unsuitable expression.  It is di'cult to avoid this evil; but one can 
render it harmless by remaining conscious of this unsuitability. In 
which case one would also not confuse the value of a function with the 
function.(1914: 257)
Here, thus, it is not that the above mathematician cannot have spoken of a concept; it is just 
that one must keep in mind that such is what he has done.
In any case, being a function, hence being unsaturated, is something very di"erent 
from having predicative nature. Correspondingly, for it to be unsaturation which generated 
Frege’s obstacle (if such were so) would be a very di"erent matter than for it to be predicative 
nature which did so. Functions do not, in general, have any predicative nature. !e sine 
function, for example, has none. One can no more predicate the sine function of something 
than one can predicate Sid of it. Of course, as Frege notes, one can predicate of something 
being that very object, Sid. Similarly, so one would have thought—barring any unexpected 
obstacle—one can predicate being that very function, the Sine function, of something. 
Moreover, one can predicate being the value of the sine function for such-and-such argument 
of something. Starting with the sine function—a function from reals to reals—one can, in a 
way described above, construct a function from objects to truth-values. Such a function 
might, e.g., map pairs of numbers onto the true just in case the second was the sine of the 
#rst. Similarly, starting with Sid one can construct functions—one which maps an object into 
the true just in case that object is Sid, one which maps an object into the true just in case it is 
an ancestor of Sid’s, and so on. !at there are such constructs confers predicative nature 
neither on Sid nor on the sine function. So far, there is no more reason to think one cannot 
treat the sine function as an object—that it is un#t for duty as an ingredient in a naming 
element—than there is to think one cannot treat Sid as an object.
Nor is it true that a concept  cannot be put to work other than as ingredient in a 
predicative thought-element. As Frege also notes, a concept, while for all that a concept, can 
be, even necessarily, one under which exactly one object, such-and-such, falls—a concept of 
being that very object, such-and-such. Now, as noted already, an object cannot itself be a 
thought-element. A naming thought-element does a piece of work which an object such as 
Sid, or the boiling point of water, or Venus—or, one would have thought, the sine function—
cannot do. !e work is making truth (the truth of some representations) turn, in part, on 
how such-and-such object is. Such is work which a concept (of the special sort just 
mentioned) is eminently suited to aid in. A naming thought-element can be thought of as 
making truth turn, in part, on how that thing which (alone) falls under such-and-such 
singular concept is. (Truth would then turn on how what falls under it is; this last remaining 
the ingredient in present sense.) It is, in fact, pointful to think in this way about naming 
elements if, or insofar as, one thinks there can be di"erent ways for a naming element to bind 
a thought, in the above way, to just one individual—di"erent ways, e.g., for a thought to make 
truth turn on how Venus is. Of course, it is contentious whether this is so—a discussion lying 
without the present discussion. !e point, though, is that there is nothing about a concept, in 
either of our two senses, which makes its involvement in a thought intrinsically involvement 
in predicative work.
It is hard to see what there is about the sine function which makes it intrinsically un#t 
for work as an ingredient in a naming element. On the other hand, there is something 
distinctive about those special sorts of functions, ones from objects to truth-values. When we 
decompose a whole thought-expression, not into its grammatical parts, but rather into an 
open sentence with #llings (of one sort or another) for its blanks, if we then think of that 
open sentence as in some sense designating, or speaking of, a function from objects (or n-
tuples thereof) to truth-values, then there is no blank space in it whose function is to be #lled 
with values of the function for #llings of the other blanks as arguments.  !us, the open 
sentence, ‘__ smokes’, as it occurs in ‘Sid smokes’, contrasts with the open sentence, ‘__ = sin 
__’, construed, as Frege sometimes does, as simply denoting the sine function. Perhaps the 
special way in which ‘__ smokes’, as above, refers to a function corresponds to its expressing 
what has a predicative nature: the (canonical) contribution of such an expression to the 
thought expressed is to make this a thought with a certain predicative thought-element 
(when decomposed in the way this expression of it suggests). Similarly, if we begin with a 
whole expression of a thought such as ‘17 = sin 3’, and abstract to the open sentence, ‘__ = sin 
__’ as there occurring, we can view this as denoting a function from pairs of numbers to 
truth-values—here according as the #rst number is, or is not, the sine of the second. !e 
open sentence so construed would then express, in the above sense, a (binary) predicative 
thought-element, predicating being the sine of of a pair of numbers, as above.
What lesson is there here? If ‘__ = sin __’ is a way of designating the sine function—if 
such is an understanding it would sometimes bear—then, by parallel, ‘__ = __ smokes’, 
understood in the same way, is a way of designating that function which maps an object into 
the value true just in case that object smokes. Similarly, where ‘__ = sin __’ is abstracted from 
its role in the sentence ‘17 = sin 3’, thus understood as designating a function without 
providing any place for its values, but only places for its arguments, then that same function 
can also be designated, leaving a place for its values, by ‘__ = (__ = sin __)’. What this shows 
is that, even by Frege’s own lights, there is not just one (canonical) way of denoting a given 
function. Frege sometimes seems to suppose that if an unsaturated expression of a certain 
sort denotes a function where predicative work is done, then it is only an expression of that 
sort which can ever denote that function. But, as we have seen, taking Frege at his word 
where he discusses what a function is, such is simply not so. A function denoted in one way 
in engaging in predicative work (that is, a function from objects to truth-values, denoted by a 
predicative part of some expression of a thought) may also be denoted in a di"erent way 
where it is only a question of identifying what function it is. If, as appears so far, the sine 
function can be put to an object’s work in some naming element—say, in an expression of the 
thought that the sine function is cyclical, with period pi—then, so, too, for functions from 
truth-values, at least on some ways of denoting them. And such will be so unless it is 
unsaturation per se, and not just predicative nature per se—which generates Frege’s obstacle.
Once again, then, we end at a now-familiar place. If functions and objects (that is, 
things #t for object-duty as ingredients in naming elements) are fundamentally di"erent—so 
much so that they cannot stand in the same relations, if such is just intrinsic to being a 
function, then, of course, there is no such thing as a function occurring as an ingredient in a 
naming-element; simply nothing it would be for such a thing to be so. If not, though, then 
not. So the question is why we should believe Frege that there is such a categorial gulf 
between concepts and objects, now understanding ‘concept’ as just function. As per usual, we 
are still in search of any reason to believe this. Whatever such reason might be, unsaturation 
begins to appear as not the root of the evil. So, it now seems, neither unsaturation nor 
predicative nature is.
To sum up, thought-elements do not recommend themselves for hosting Frege’s 
obstacle. Nor do Bedeutung-elements. What an element cannot ever do is be an element of 
another type. But if there were a thought in which an element was named, that named 
element would not be an element of that thought at all. It would be an ingredient of a naming 
element. Like Sid, it would be, not making truth turn on such-and-such, but rather just some 
such such-and-such. So it must be ingredients, speci#cally concepts, which are the host. But 
the features Frege mentions as peculiar to concepts do not generate the obstacle. For that we 
need an extra assumption which, while equivalent to the obstacle, seems, so far, equally 
gratuitous. We must look further.
2.3. Stratifying: As noted, neither Guy nor any kinsman is #t for predicative duty. Nor is 
Venus, the current housing shortage, the ph-level of Sid’s pool, nor, as we have just seen, the 
sine function. One could go on. Many objects are un#t for predicative service: they are not 
ways for a thing, or for things, to be. What is wanted, though, is a converse point: nothing 
ever #t for service as predicative ingredient is ever #t for service as naming ingredient—and 
thus a stronger point, that no object can ever do predicative duty. We would thus have an 
ontological result: there are two absolutely distinct classes of things, ‘objects’ and ‘concepts’; 
the distinction between these is categorial. Frege’s route to this result appears to be through 
representation. In representing things as being some way or other, di"erent sorts of work is 
done. !ere is naming; there is predicating. Doing the one is never doing the other. In each 
of these, something is put to a distinctive sort of work. Each has its distinctive way of 
representing that which is thus put to work. What is represented in the one way can never be 
represented in the other. !ere is no such thing as that. Does the ontology follow? A 
suspicion arises at this point that, as later Wittgenstein once put it, “We predicate of the thing 
what lies in the method of representing it.” (Investigations §104). Perhaps mere suspicion.
Here, then, is how Frege makes the point:
We have here a word, ‘Venus’, which can never really be a predicate, 
although it can form a part of a predicate. !e Bedeutung of this word 
can thus never occur as a concept, but only as an object. Kerry, too, 
would surely not wish to contest that there is something of this sort. 
But thus a distinction would be allowed between that which can only 
occur as an object and everything else, the recognition of which is most 
important. Nor would this distinction be erased if it were true, as Kerry 
thinks, that there are concepts which can also be objects. (1892: 
194-195)
Two things we can agree on here. First, the word ‘Venus’ is not a predicate—not even if we 
could make sense of calling someone ‘a Venus’. Second, Venus (the planet) is, like my friend 
Guy, absolutely un#t for duty as a predicative ingredient. So, third, as Frege says, there is, 
indeed, a distinction between that which can only occur as (in the role of) an object and 
everything else.
!e mystery here lies in the word ‘thus’ in the second sentence. Frege admits that there 
would still be that just-mentioned important distinction even if there were also things which, 
while #t for predicative duty were also #t for duty as objects. Why, then, suggest that it is 
because ‘Venus’ can never occur as a predicate that what it denotes, the planet, can never 
‘occur as a concept’? Let us say that for ‘Venus’ to occur as a predicate would be for it to put 
what it denotes, or speaks of, to predicative work—as ‘smokes’ puts being a smoker to 
predicative work (where it does). What Venus denotes cannot be put to predicative work. 
!is we know anyway. But why should we not suppose that, while ‘Venus’ cannot put what it 
denotes to predicative work, something else which denoted that same thing could do this? Of 
course, we should not suppose this because the denotation happens to be Venus. Cf. Guy. But 
since it is not yet ruled out that there should be items #t for both predicative and naming 
service, why should the possibility just scouted not arise for them, should there be such?
Frege also writes,
Not infrequently in logical investigation one needs to say something 
about a concept, and then to express this in the usual form for such 
predications, namely such that what is predicated is contained in the 
grammatical predicate. Accordingly one would expect the Bedeutung of 
the grammatical subject to be the concept; but due to its predicative 
nature this cannot without further ado appear as such, but must #rst be 
transformed into an object, or, more exactly, an object must stand in 
for it, which we designate by means of the pre#x ‘the concept’, as in 
“!e concept man is not empty.” (1892: 197)
One claim here is that, due to the ‘predicative nature’ of a ‘concept’, anything which is a name 
(that is, which expresses a naming element in a thought) cannot be naming a concept. Again, 
this would make Frege’s case for whatever concepts are thus to be understood to be. Once 
again we are on familiar ground. !ere is no one thing ‘predicative nature’ obviously must 
mean, nor, equally, any one thing ‘concept’ must mean. But suppose that to predicate 
something of something is to make truth turn on what things are some given way there is for 
things to be. !en nothing in the nature of the predicating, or nothing we have yet seen, 
prevents either what makes truth so turn (a predicative thought-element), or on what it thus 
turns (a way for a thing to be) ineligible for itself serving as a subject of (of course di"erent) 
predications—ways of making truth turn on which things are given ways where predicative 
thought-elements, and/or ways for a thing to be are among the things eligible for being (or 
not) those ways. If bedeutet is to be a technical term, one could, of course, stipulate that, for 
anything with ‘predicative nature’, in one of the above senses, it has not been bedeutet unless 
thereby put to predicative work. One cannot, though, rule out by stipulation the truth of 
some thought turning (on some decomposition of it) on which ways some way for a thing to 
be, or some given predicative thought-element, is.
Frege does not deny, however, that things may be predicated of concepts. Concepts 
may be represented as falling under higher-order concepts. One can bring a concept under 
another higher one. What one cannot do, he thinks, is to predicate of a concept what might 
also be predicated of an object, say, of Guy and his kin. So one thing one thus cannot do is to 
predicate something of a concept in putting it to work as an ingredient in a naming 
element—that is, by putting it to an object’s work. Perhaps there is a clue here to exactly what 
is blocked by the obstacle to saying what we seem to want to say; hence why it is.
!omas Ricketts suggests something on these lines when, in a recent discussion, he 
remarks,
Kerry’s objection rests on a failure … to appreciate how the di"erence 
… between complete and incomplete parts of sentences and the 
thoughts they express evinces the striation of quanti#cational 
generality into levels. For Frege, the debate stops here. (2010: 198)
!e crucial idea here—that on which Kerry’s objection founders—is to be: (In logical form) 
predication, and correspondingly quanti#cation, is strati#ed—comes in hierarchies. We may 
begin, then, with the notion of an hierarchy. At its origin, this is an idea about the structure 
of representations (of something as something). If Frege is right, it has consequences for 
structures inherent in what does not represent, but, rather, there is to be represented as thus 
and so; ones which will mean, inter alia, that an ingredient in a naming element in any 
thought can be #t only for that representational duty.
But, to start at the origin, the hierarchy is one of thought-elements, or, more precisely, 
of abstractions therefrom, certain thought-element types. At ground level in this hierarchy 
are naming elements—things which make a thought’s truth turn on how something doing 
object’s duty is. At the next level are (#rst-order) (n-place) predicative elements. !ese 
combine with naming elements to form thoughts. So combined, they predicate being some 
way for an object to be of what the relevant naming element names. At the next level are 
second-order predicative elements. In our present vocabulary, these predicate things of 
ingredients in #rst-order predicative elements. !ey combine with #rst-order predicative 
elements to do so. And so on as far up the hierarchy as one cares to go. Where there is 
predication there is also opportunity for quanti#cation. At #rst level, one may quantify with 
respect to a #rst-order predicative element—instead of such-and-such is thus and so, 
something is, or everything is. Such is #rst-order predication. At second order, one quanti#es 
with respect to a second-order predicative element. And so on on up.
So far, these are remarks about certain forms of representing: logical forms. !e idea is: 
logical forms are formed of certain element types; it is intrinsic to a relevant type to be at a 
certain level in a hierarchy; a logical form is well-formed (that is, a logical form at all) only if 
the elements which form it are of suitable levels relative to one another. !ere is, of course, a 
trivial and familiar extension of this point to sets of forms. Suppose we have a stock of 
thoughts, each of a given logical form. !en if in one of these there is, e.g., such-and-such 
#rst-order predicative element, that element does not occur in a form assigned to any other 
thought as any other than a #rst-order predicative element. So it never, e.g., combines with 
another #rst-order predicative element in the way that a second-order predicative element 
would in predicating something of what it is the role of a second-order predicative element to 
predicate of. As said, this is a trivial point. Each type of element is essentially of that type.
A logical form, as here understood, is an abstraction from a decomposition of a 
thought. !e central point of a decomposition is to identify features in a thought which it 
shares with others. To decompose a thought is to present it as instancing each of a given set 
of generalisations. Among the features in question are those relevant to the holding of logical 
relations (those to which such relations are sensitive). A central logical relation is (logical) 
entailment. But here I leave it to logic to say what relations concern it. Delete all other 
identifying features from an thought-element on a decomposition, and what is le$ is a logical 
form. Logic generates a stock of logical forms—the ones there are for a thought to take—out 
of some stock of (for it) signi#cant element-types (marking the di"erences between the ways 
there are of contributing to participation in logical relations); as with any stock of items 
generated out of some #xed vocabulary, imposing on each form a certain structure.
So far we have a hierarchy of logical forms (and elements therein). But this hierarchy 
suggests two further hierarchies. Each is a hierarchy of things which relate in a certain way to 
elements. Now, though, to bring things into question, these elements need to be elements of 
(decompositions of) thoughts, rather than of logical forms. (Again, a decomposition can be 
thought of as a (eshed-out logical form.)  !ere are two hierarchies here because in Frege’s 
scheme of things objects serve two functions. First, they are ingredients in naming elements. 
!at is, they are (at #rst-order) that of which things are predicated. Second, they are the 
Bedeutung of naming elements—those arguments of that function whose values for them 
record the world’s answer to the relevant thought’s question of truth.
In both hierarchies objects stand on the bottom step. !ey are zero-order. For the #rst 
of these, the crucial thing about objects is that they are that over which one quanti#es in 
quantifying with respect to a given #rst-order predicate. In which case, what occupies the 
next step in the hierarchy should be that over which one quanti#es in quantifying with 
respect to a #rst-order predicate. !is, plausibly, is that which is predicated of an object in a 
#rst-order predicate, which is being a certain way there is for an object to be (or, speaking a 
bit more stiltedly, just that way for an object to be). So here one quanti#es over ways for an 
object to be, or being them. At the next level, then, one would quantify over ways for a way 
for an object to be to be (or being them). And so on on up.
!e second hierarchy would again have objects at zero-level. But the guiding idea here 
would be that an object is the Bedeutung of a naming element. At #rst-level, then, what is 
wanted is the Bedeutung of a #rst-order predicative element. In Frege’s scheme of things this 
would be a concept2. At second-level what would be wanted is the Bedeutung of a second-
order predicative element. !is should be a second-order concept2, that is, a function from 
functions from objects to truth-values to truth-values. And so on on up.
For purposes of the main point to come, you may choose either of these hierarchies 
you like. For convenience I will speak of the #rst. Either way, starting from a hierarchy of 
representational forms, we have move to a hierarchy of things. For the hierarchy of forms 
there was a trivial point: no form-element which ever occurs at any level in the hierarchy ever 
occurs at any other. Suppose that the steps in our hierarchies of things are similarly disjoint: 
what is found at one step in the hierarchy is found at no other. !en a parallel point holds for 
these. Anything found at level zero—the level of objects—is found nowhere else. Guy and his 
kin are found at the level; hence they are found nowhere else. "at they are found nowhere 
else is nothing new. But the ‘hence’ is. For now we can say: if, say, some function from objects 
to truth-values were found at zero-level in the hierarchy of Bedeutungen, then it could never 
be the Bedeutung of any predicative element. Hence it is not found there. Similarly for 
ingredients in predicative elements. If one such were found at zero level in its hierarchy, it 
could not be found at level one—could not be a predicative element. We thus arrive at Frege’s 
result. All that is found at zero-level is what is absolutely un#t for predicative work. And there 
is some reason to think we arrive here with right. For, the idea would be, if something ever 
occurred as an ingredient in a #rst-order predicative element—if it were predicated of an 
object in any thought—then when it came to predicating things of it, this would have to be 
via a second-order predication. Which would not be so if the same thing ever occurred in the 
guise of an object in any thought, as it would if it occurred at zero level.
Have we, then, proven that there is an obstacle? If the hierarchy of forms imposes such 
hierarchies on things, then yes. But we do need to suppose that the hierarchy of forms 
imposes these hierarchies on things; notably, hierarchies with disjoint steps. At level zero go 
ingredients in naming elements. !is prescription is meant to identify a de#nite set. But 
how? To speak slightly picturesquely, we would have to search through a certain set of 
decompositions of thoughts, and, wherever we came to a naming element, extract from it its 
ingredient. !ese would then accumulate to the content of level zero (in both hierarchies of 
things). What set would this be? It would be that set which, for each thought, contained all its 
decompositions as members. So to speak, the set would be formed through assigning to each 
thought there is, all at once, all the logical forms ever to be found in it.
Two assumptions have now emerged. !at it is #xed tout court what decompositions 
each thought does admit of; that restrictions on co-occurrence in a corpus allow for 
assigning all decompositions to all thoughts at once. To see what these come to let us change 
perspective. !e hierarchy of forms, as we are now trying to understand it, imposes 
constraints, not just on (or through) what logical forms there are, but also on what 
combinations of forms are permissible. Given Frege’s idea of the multiple decomposability of 
thoughts, it is not as though ‘to each thought its form’. Rather, for any given thought, there 
may be many forms to carve out of it, as there are many decompositions to carve out of it. So 
the idea of permissible co-occurrence of forms can be seen as, in the #rst instance, one of 
constraints on co-occurrence of forms on an assignment of a form to each thought in some 
corpus of. In an assignment, the idea is, one thought cannot take on such-and-such form 
while another takes on such-and-such other. Or, more exactly, it is an idea of constraints on 
permissible assignments of decompositions, one each, to the thoughts of some corpus. (Since 
though, on present assumptions, a decomposition determines a unique form, we so far have 
no reason to think that a form determines an ingredient, e.g., of a naming element.)
!e idea would be: in making an assignment of decompositions to a corpus (one for 
each thought in it), one cannot simultaneously decompose some given thought into, inter 
alia, a naming element with such-and-such ingredient, and some given thought into, inter 
alia, a predicative element with that same thing as ingredient. (!e point here does not 
require there to be no such legitimate notion same thing.) Such, the hierarchy tells us, would 
countenance illegitimate forms of predication. What this obviously does not rule out is that 
what is an ingredient of a naming element on one assignment of decompositions to some 
corpus cannot be an ingredient of a predicative element on another assignment to some 
corpus. !e hierarchy of forms (a logical fact) cannot, from this perspective, so constrain the 
extra-logical work of carving decompositions out of whole thoughts. Such a possibility would 
spoil the idea that a hierarchy of forms does impose a hierarchy on things of any of the two 
sorts scouted. Nor, without such an absolute categorisation of things, would the existence of a 
hierarchy of forms deprive us, per se, of a notion same ingredient with which to state all the 
above.
What, though, of quanti#cation? Suppose that, on some assignment to some corpus, 
there is a thought assigned the form of a universal quanti#cation. Of just what must the 
predicate thus quanti#ed be true for that thought to be true? Presumably not just of all of 
what counts, or is treated, as an object in some decomposition within the corpus. Well, 
determining what might count as an object (or be put to an object’s work in a naming 
element) is, anyway, extra-logical work. Is there a rich enough stock of determinate answers 
to questions as to whether such-and-such is Sid? Such depends on just how agile, or 
mercurial, Sid would have to be were there such a thing. So, too, for determining what might 
so count for purposes of the assignment in question. One idea might be this. Consider a 
closure of the corpus under the operation universal instantiation, wherever instantiation is to 
a permissible decomposition (one which can co-occur with what was already there). !en 
count the quanti#cation as true just in case all possible such instantiations are. (Again, such 
is not pure logical work.)
III
3.1. Without Sense: I turn now to the second remark in that pregnant paragraph of Conant’s 
essay. It concerns the nature and status of logic—chez Young Wittgenstein (henceforth YW), 
and full stop. It is this:
!e central source of confusion in Frege's thought about logic is 
located … by the Tractatus in the one assumption that it shares with 
psychologism (that "widespread philosophical disease"): that logic is a 
science. … It is only once one has broken with the idea that logic is a 
science that one is free of the disease. (1991: 141)
I do not disagree with Conant as to what YW thought was Frege’s crucial mistake. Rather, 
what follows is a case that what YW saw as Frege’s crucial misconception about logic and 
what (if Frege held it) was the crucial point are two very di"erent things. !ere is a good idea 
of Frege’s (set out below) which YW, if not blind to, simply rejected. !e absence of that good 
idea (in its entirety), inevitably blinds one to what is crucial here. !e trajectory from YW to 
mature Wittgenstein (henceforth MW), seen one way, just is a slow coming to see the value 
of this crucial point. One might, not for this alone, see the path Wittgenstein followed from 
1929 on as a return to Frege.
We must start, though, with what Frege’s point was meant to be. A not implausible 
reading of him on this might begin with the idea that logic is even-handed. It is about any 
thought only insofar as it is about all. So the features of a thought to which it is sensitive—
those by which a logical relation holds or fails to—are features one might #nd in a thought 
regardless of its subject matter. Hence, on the conception, logic has no special subject-matter. 
So decompose a truth of logic (which, the conception tells us, would be, like any truth, a 
thought) and you will #nd no predicative element in it which makes truth turn on what is, 
what not, some given way there is for things to be; or at least a way susceptibility to being 
which might identify, in the #rst-order case, objects as ones of some special kind (e.g., 
sublunary), in the second-order case, ways of some special kind for an object to be, and so 
on. Such thoughts, the idea is, would have nothing but their structure to make them true; 
something their structure would oblige with in the case of truths of logic.
Such structural truths, the idea continues, would re(ect a structure intrinsic to a 
domain of things structured (or structurable) by those features which, combined as they do 
in a truth of logic, make for truth per se. !e relevant features are ones on which the truth of 
thoughts depends—on which it alone depends in logical truths and falsehoods. So they are, 
too, ones on which the holding of relations such as logical entailment depends. So the 
structure these features impose on the domain in question, or that re(ected in logical truths, 
is the most general intrinsic structure of truth-preserving paths. !e nodes on such paths are, 
then, truth-bearers—those which bring truth into question—so thoughts, on Frege’s notion of 
this. So the domain is a domain of thoughts.
So logic contains, inter alia, logical truths. But logical truths, on the conception, are 
thoughts stripped of all but their structure. Such thoughts would belong to a special region of 
the domain: that of the most general thoughts. Or so the conception has things. For, on it, 
starting from any thought without this region one can, through a series of thought-preserving 
transformations, derive a member of the region. (By ‘thought-preserving I here mean: 
transforming thoughts into thoughts.) !ose operations are quanti#cations. Where there is a 
thought-element with some topic-speci#c content, replace it with a quanti#cation over 
thought-elements of its type. Conversely, one can apply logical truths in inference by 
reversing the procedure: instantiating at enough points where there is a quanti#er. Call all of 
this Frege-inspired conception F*.
One might well doubt at least one bit of this. !e worry would be: if you strip all 
particular content out of a thought, what you are le$ with is not a thought. Making truth turn 
in part on who smokes exempli#es a particular type of contribution to a thought: that made 
by (or in) #rst-order predication. Making truth turn on what waddles, or what just fell on the 
rug, do so too. By contrast, if you strip away all particular content from an exemplar, what is 
le$, it seems is no exemplar at all. Such seems to clash with the also-plausible idea that 
quanti#cation is an operation preserving thought-hood. Nonetheless, there is something 
right in this idea.
And YW was suspicious of the idea that thoughts with all particular content stripped 
away were still, for all that, (fully) thoughts. His suspicion, though, took the wrong form. It is 
expressed in the idea that laws, or propositions, of logic say nothing. YW does not deny that 
quanti#cations are thoughthood-preserving operations. !ey yield well-formed structurings 
of ways of legitimate contributions to a thought. Nor does he refrain from calling 
propositions of logic both propositions and true (nor contradictions false). Still, as Conant 
puts it, such things are degenerate cases of thoughts. !ey pose no genuine question of truth. 
To fail at this, one might think, is just to fail to be a thought. To bracket this issue I will 
henceforth call such things, in logic and beyond, as dicta.
For logic not to be a science might be any of several things, depending on just what 
explanatory, or predictive, ambitions one thinks intrinsic to a science. (‘Predictive’ in the 
sense in which a theory of English syntax predicts what is, what not, a sentence.) At the very 
least, though, one expects that there is a science only where there is some set of facts for the 
science to state: the science would consist (at least) in stating (or predicting) them. Logic, if 
its dicta say nothing, fails this minimum requirement. So, for the moment, it will do to take 
this as a reading of the idea that logic is not a science. YW may ask more. MW, as we will see, 
has a more subtle reading of the idea.
Here is one set of expressions, by YW, of the idea that logic’s dicta say nothing:
!e propositions of logic are tautologies. (6.1)
!e propositions of logic therefore say nothing. … (6.11)
!eories which make a proposition of logic appear substantial are 
always false. … (6.111)
!e propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of 
propositions by combining these into propositions which say nothing. 
(6.121)
It is the characteristic mark of logical propositions that one can 
recognise in the symbol alone that they are true … . (6.113)
Tautology and contradiction are not pictures of reality. !ey represent 
no possible state of a"airs. For the one allows every state of a"airs, the 
other none.
In the tautology the conditions of agreement with the world … 
cancel one another, so that it stand in no presenting relation to reality.
(4.462)
A tautology has no truth conditions, since it is unconditionally true; 
and the contradiction is true under no conditions.
Tautology and contradiction are without sense. (4.461)
And here is a rather di"erent one:
Not only must a proposition of logic be incapable of being refuted by 
any possible experience, but it must also be incapable of being 
con#rmed by any such. (6.1222)
!ere are di"erent notions here which will soon prove to come apart. !e #rst set and this 
last correspond naturally to di"erent intuitive ideas.
Corresponding to the #rst set is an idea about representing-as (representing something 
as (being) something. !ere are two terms of a relation here: what is represented as (being) 
something; what it is represented as. It is with just this relation that truth can come into 
question. Now the idea is: where there is a genuine case of this relation, neither of these two 
parties is allowed to idle. Truth is the yield a genuine cooperative enterprise between them. 
Party of the second part poses a question of truth; makes truth turn on party of the second. 
Party of the second then, in being as it is, yields an answer to the question thus posed. In a 
logical dictum, as YW puts it, one can recognise ‘in the symbol itself ’ that there is truth. 
Party of the second, so to speak, bars party of the #rst from any participation in the joint 
enterprise. It matters not at all how party of the second is. But, the thought would be, such is 
simply not representing-as; not the genuine holding of a relation between two parties. 
(Anything would do as well in that #rst position as anything else.) Such is one intuitive idea.
!e last idea of saying nothing connects in a special way with an idea of logic not being 
a science. A thought might be: if experience could bear on whether some logical dicta was 
true, then if it is true, there is room for explaining why. But if there is such room, then there 
is room for a science whose task would be to explain this. Frege writes agains the idea of such 
room in saying,
!e question why, and with what right, we take a law of logic to be 
true, logic can answer only by reducing it to another law of logic. 
Where that is not possible, logic can give no answer. (1893: xvii)
He goes on to suggest: where logic has nothing to say as to why a law of logic is true, nor can 
anything else. !is idea that nothing extra-logical can bear on whether logic’s dicta are true 
(read as with YW above) suggests that, necessarily, logic is immutable’ would be as it is no 
matter what—an idea Frege puts picturesquely in describing logic’s dicta as “like boundary 
stones set in an eternal foundation, which our thought can over(ow, but never displace”. 
!us, Frege tells us, their “authority for our thought”. (1893: xvi) Whether the intuition is 
rightly read either thus or as per YW is for later consideration.
What YW sees, or seems to, then, is that the rest of Frege’s conception of logic, as per 
above, clashes with the idea that laws of logic say something—are full-(edged thoughts. 
Logic’s dicta re(ect the structure of a system. What is thus structured—what composes this 
system—are those things between which logical relations hold—thus, thoughts (though 
Frege and YW use that term in di"erent ways). !e clash is to be resolved by removing the 
idea that logic’s dicta say something; that they are themselves fully members of the system. 
!e next step is to examine YW’s general notion of a system.
3.2. Systems: !e Tractatus explains its use of ‘system’ through examples. What is in question 
in the examples is systems of ‘descriptions’: unquestionably things by which truth can come 
into question; ways of making truth turn substantially on how things are. !ese will be 
systems whose ambitions are much more limited than those of any Grand System. Such a 
special system does not aim to provide representations of things as all the ways there are for 
one to think things, but only for (some of) how things stand on some particular topic one 
might engage with. Each such system, the idea is, has a most general structure which is 
proprietary to it. !is structure is re(ected in some set of dicta the system generates. Many—
perhaps not all—of these are generated from the system’s vocabulary, but put together in such 
a way as not to belong to the descriptions of things the system generates.
A limited system, like a language, generates some stock of descriptions from some 
given vocabulary and syntax. A structure is thereby imposed on each. A description’s place 
within the structure is #xed both by elements it shares with others and by ways it contrasts 
with others, thus by the vocabulary (and/or structuring) others have and it lacks. To be a 
given member of the system just is to be something the system generates. It is thus, per se, to 
be structured as the system structures this. If I want to represent Sid, say, as I take him to be, 
it is to a considerable extent at my discretion just which way to represent him as being. !e 
role of a special system is to exhaust such discretion. Once Sid is described as #tting some 
description chosen from a special system, all discretion over how to represent him as being is 
used up.
6.341 o"ers two illustrations. !e #rst is a system for describing patterns of black dots 
(or lines) made on a white (at surface. !e system’s descriptions are de#ned in terms of a net, 
thought of as placed in a given orientation of the surface to be described. !e net consists of 
cells at given addresses in the net, each of given size and shape. A description in the system 
consists of a sequence of ordered pairs. !e #rst item in a pair is a cell’s address. !e second 
is either the description ‘black’ or the description ‘white’ according as the surface underneath 
the cell is predominantly black or predominantly white.
Examples of dicta of the system would be: (if its cells are hexagonal) that each ordered 
pair in a sequence describes a hexagonal portion of such-and-such size of the surface being 
described, or that a (well-formed) sequence of such-and-such length is a grammatically full 
description within the system. !ese, the point is, say nothing about the surface being 
described. Such illustrates the notion of saying nothing on which such is what dicta do. On 
the other hand, that the pattern on a given surface can be completely described by some 
description in the system (where ‘complete’ means that it is fully determined what the pattern 
is) does say something about the surface (given the system); and vice-versa.
Newtonian mechanics provides the second illustration. Here the system is to generate 
descriptions of mechanical states and interactions of rigid bodies—e.g., of that six-pack 
(ying towards that windshield. !e laws (and de#nitions) of Newtonian mechanics are 
(among) what #xes relations between such descriptions. So they are among the system’s 
dicta. !ese are meant to be dicta, and hence to say nothing (about the world), in just the 
same way as, say the dictum that no area beneath a cell can count both as white and as black 
says nothing. (6.342) !ey merely say how those terms spelled ‘velocity’, ‘mass’, etc. are to be 
used. By contrast, ‘!e six-pack has a momentum of 76kgm/sec’ does say something about 
the world.
So, it seems, there is a contrast here between two sorts of representation. !e one, if in 
order, re(ects the structure of the system, hence says nothing about the world. !e other 
describes the structure of the world. So, presumably, it does not identify the structure of the 
system. For a dictum to be correct (in the only sense in which it might be) is simply for the 
system to have the structure it re(ects; which is just the same as for it to be a dictum. A 
dictum, the idea is, merely re(ects the system’s workings. It thus in no way chances its hand. 
!e structure its dicta re(ect is intrinsic to a system. Such is intrinsic to being a dictum. For a 
dictum to be is for it to be so structured. Nor, we are to suppose, is the system’s existence in 
any way hostage to how things are. A system in this sense is not something there might have 
failed to be.
Special systems di"er from a Grand System in several ways. Here are two. First, one 
can choose to describe the mechanical states of rigid bodies or not. Whereas, for a thinker, 
there is no choice as to whether to engage in representing-as. Second, there may be many 
systems of descriptions of the same thing—e.g, mechanical phenomena. A special system’s 
dicta apply to all representing which exploits it, but not thereby to all representing, or even all 
representing on a given topic. Whereas there is no representing other than within the Grand 
System, thus none not subject to its dicta. Newtonian dicta re(ect the conferring of content 
(the using up of the discretionary). !e structure logic’s dicta re(ect (on our present 
conception of logic) is a structure intrinsic to all representing. !ere is no such thing as 
evading them. Which seems to mean: no such thing as representing being structured 
otherwise.
!e dicta of a special system select between choices of how to represent things (as 
being). !ose of the Grand System do not. Accordingly, while there might be a project of 
saying which choices a special system made, and there might be reasons for making these, 
there is no such project for the Grand System, so nothing parallel in it for which reasons 
might be given. Such adds content to the idea that logic is not a science. It is a way in which a 
special system, and its dicta, contrast with the Grand System. Are there interesting ways in 
which special dicta and logic’s are the same?
3.3. Gedanken and Sätze: Concluding its illustrations of special systems, the Tractatus 
remarks:
And now we see how logic and mechanics relate to one another. 
(6.342)
!e discussion thus begun concludes:
Although the spots in our picture are geometrical #gures, obviously 
geometry can say nothing at all as to their actual form and position. 
But the net is purely geometrical; all its properties can be given a priori.
Laws, like the principle of causation, etc., treat of the network, 
not of that which the network describes. (6.35)
One comparison: so, too, for logic’s dicta. !ey, too, speak only of that most general network 
of truth-preserving paths which structure that system (a Grand One) to which any thought 
belongs. How, though, do special systems compare with Grand Ones?
As background to comparison I now introduce two central and closely linked ideas of 
Frege’s. !e #rst is that thoughts are multiply decomposable: there is no such thing as ‘the set 
of elements which compose a given thought’, much less ‘the way a thought is structured.’ Such 
is re(ected in the fact that the same thought can be expressed in syntactically and 
semantically diverse sentences. Such is corollary to what he claims as most distinctive in his 
approach to logic (see 1919a): putting truth #rst; next whole questions of it. (One crucial 
application for Frege is in showing how the thought expressed in ‘Sid smokes’, where ‘__ 
smokes’ bedeutet a certain concept, can also be expressed without bedeutende that concept at 
all—as in ‘!e concept smokes is satis#ed by Sid’(cf. 1892: 199-200). A thought may be 
carved, as a goose may, into any of many diverse sets of parts. Like a goose, it is not generated 
out of some particular set of independently existing parts. (Such is integral to Frege’s anti-
psychologism: nothing but a role in a thought makes anything the right sort of thing to play 
it.) Here, too, the idea that a thought is an object of intellectual, and, necessarily, not sensory, 
awareness. A thought abstracts from representing-as a pure question of truth; distinguished 
from others only by its way of making truth turn on how things are. "us it is that Mont 
Blanc, like Sid and the True, cannot be a thought-element.
Russell, missing the notion’s rationale, had an aversion to Frege’s notion thought,  more 
generally, Sinn. YW seems to have inherited it. But, as with Russell, such is to miss the 
point—one which will now prove crucial for evaluating F*. A thought is a pure way of 
making truth turn on how things are. What it does can be broken up into subtasks. But, 
stripped of features, such as sensible ones, identi#able independent of it, no particular way of 
thus decomposing it can claim objective priority—can claim to be that way by which it is 
intrinsically identi#ed as the one it is.
How, then, is a thought identi#able? !e question brings us to Frege’s second idea. It is 
that it is intrinsic to a thought to be that which ‘can be grasped as the same by di"erent 
thinkers’ (cf. 1919b: 146). A thought needs no ‘bearer’—no one to whom it relates in some 
special way. A thought need not be thought; a fortiori, not by anyone in particular. A thought 
marks (or just is) a point at which (inde#nitely many) di"erent thinkers may agree, dispute, 
jointly investigate, jointly #nd proof or refutation. It identi#es something one can get right or 
wrong.
What, then, is intrinsic to a thought? One can say: when (in what cases) things would 
be as that thought represents them. Now, Frege also stresses, two thinkers are disputing or 
agreeing only where they agree well enough as to what it is to which they are agreeing, or 
about which they dispute. If we think of a thought as identi#ed by when things would be as 
represented, then there, accordingly, what there is to recognise as to when it is that thought 
which is in question. Parties to a dispute over its truth would need to agree to enough of this. 
But suppose I now express a thought. Fictionalising slightly, I might do so in now saying that 
that six-pack will break the windshield. Maintaining the #ction (e.g., waving the question 
which windshield), it hardly strains credulity to suppose that there are those among us who 
understand me—that is, know what I said. !ose who do so are, accordingly, equipped to 
recognise when things will have been as I said. !ey enjoy such capacity. We, then (they and 
us), thereby agree on that which identi#es something there is to dispute or agree to. What we 
are equipped, or prepared, to agree to thus identi#es a certain thought.
Now identify a thought however else you like. Is it the one we had in mind above? Such 
is a substantial question. Its answer depends, for one thing, on what is to count as same 
thought. But again it is no strain on credulity to suppose this a question we understand. If we 
do, then again we are capable of recognising when a thought would, when not, count as that 
one we had in mind. (!e point stands no matter how occasion-sensitive the operation of 
such capacity may be.) We are thus equipped to recognise when, and how, that substantial 
question has been answered.
With which we return to the Tractatus’ special systems. !ese reverse Frege’s priorities. 
For Frege whole thoughts come #rst. In decomposing elements are carved out of these, ad lib, 
so long as parts are in the same business as the whole, and jointly just are it. Whereas for YW 
it is some stock of elements, and a syntax, which come #rst. In a special system play the role 
of thoughts for him—signi#cant propositions—are generated from this basis. So while 
Frege’s thoughts are multiply decomposable, what play that role for YW—that by which truth 
can come into question—are precisely what is generated from the basis; to be which is to be 
structured in just that way thus imposed on them. To exhaust the discretionary in 
representing is thus to be so structured. And, as opposed to Frege, to represent in, or via, a 
member of some such system is to produce representing intrinsically so structured.
!e representations of a special system are thus not multiply decomposable as it is 
intrinsic to a Fregean thought to be. !ey correspond, at best, to a decomposition of a 
thought. A thought in Frege’s sense could not belong to a special system. At best it could be 
represented, or presented, in the system as decomposed in a particular way. Of course, a 
special system structures its elements in proprietary ways, re(ected in its proprietary dicta. 
So its decompositions would be not just into given logical forms, but logical forms in which 
content to which logic is indi"erent is also structured in particular ways.
Suppose, now, we choose a given thought—say, that the six-pack is (ying towards the 
windshield with momentum 76kg/m-sec. !en we select a special system—say, the Tractatus’ 
Newtonian-mechanical one. Is that thought representable in that system? If, but only if, it is 
structurable as some description of the system is. Seeing whether that is so is extra-
systematic work. !e system itself contains no resources for approaching the question. !e 
point generalises to the question in what systems the thought just mentioned is 
representable. What might answer such a question? Here we may refer to Frege’s second idea. 
Above I mentioned a thought: that the six-pack is (ying towards the windshield. I spoke 
understandably. !ere are those who understand what thought was mentioned. !ey are thus 
able to recognise (well enough) when that thought has been mentioned. Now structure some 
representing as some given special system—e.g., the Tractatus’ Newtonian system—does. 
Would those who thus grasp what thought is now in question be prepared to recognise it as 
so structurable—that member of the system as saying things to be as that thought represents 
them? !us are such questions answered.
Unlike that Grand System which logic is meant to structure, a special system is made 
up, not of thoughts, but rather of structurings for a thought to admit of. To #nd a point in a 
special system at which some given thought is represented (decomposed in a particular way) 
is to engage in extra-systematic work. Relations between decompositions and thoughts are 
not a special system’s concern. By nature, a thought is what might be represented (or 
expressed) in any of many di"erent special systems. What had no place in a grand system 
would not be a thought. Not so what had no place (expression) within some special system. 
For all that, it might #nd expression in another. Similarly, a decomposition of a thought 
might, for all of its so being, #nd no place in some special system in which that thought was 
expressible. But it could not be a structure by which the thought was not related to others 
within a Grand System.
A Grand System, by F*, is composed of thoughts. If Frege is right in putting whole 
thoughts #rst, then it would be made up of precisely what a special system, for YW, is not. In 
any case, a Grand System di"ers from a special one in this: to represent, even about a given 
subject matter, one need not represent in any given special systems (there might be many, 
e.g., for representing the mechanics of rigid bodies); whereas if there is Grand System, there 
is no representing at all except within it.
3.4. Two Kinds of Saying Nothing: YW uses special systems to illustrate something. But one 
might now wonder whether what they do illustrate is quite what he meant them to. For a 
start, they exhibit something about the notion saying nothing. YW’s own ideas of saying 
nothing, as cited above, divide in two (or three). !ere is, for a start, the simple idea of saying 
nothing as opposed to saying something, where this means: to say such-and-such, for some 
such-and-such. YW elaborates this idea on these lines: thought elements which may be 
combined with others so as to say something in present sense may also be combined with 
others, depending on the others, so as to ‘cancel out’, thus say nothing. ‘All bachelors drink’ 
says something. ‘All bachelors are single’ does not: being single is already contained in being 
a bachelor. Where elements cancel each other out in some such sense, one can recognise 
from ‘the symbol itself ’—from the thought, or its expression—that it is true (casu quo false).
!is #rst simple idea is well displayed in the idea of a special system. !e system 
combines elements into ‘descriptions’—genuine representations of things as being thus and 
so. But these same elements can also be combined so as to cancel each other out. For 
example, in the system for describing patterns on walls, elements in a description of a cell of 
as white, and those in a description of a cell as black can be combined into a proposition, ‘If a 
cell is white, then it is not black’. But such combinations do not belong to the system of wall-
descriptions generated. Rather, their failure at this marks them as in another role: they re(ect 
the most general proprietary structure of the system. !ey are thus dicta. (It is implausible 
that all dicta of a special system can be so regarded. But such worries do not touch the 
present point.)
Such is an idea of a dictum of a special system saying nothing. It belongs to the system. 
But it does not belong to the stock of descriptions—representations of things as being thus 
and so—that the system generates. !e system assigns it nothing as that which it says to be 
(or represents as being) so. Hence, in our #rst sense, it says nothing. "is notion of saying 
nothing is a system-relative notion. So, in light of the last section, it has no, or no immediate, 
application to thoughts (on Frege’s conception of what thoughts are). A thought has (or 
lacks) a representation in a system (‘represent’ here not represent-as, but rather stand in for, 
vertreten.) A thought which lacks a representative in the stock of descriptions some given 
special system generates might yet have one in another. Further, for all we know so far, a 
thought might have the status of a dictum in one special system, and that of a description in 
another. A simple example: Sid arrives at Vesuvio (for one of those upper-Douro weekends 
among the familias-boas), to be told by his hostess that his room is #rst (oor, end le$. He is 
thus assigned a room. !ere is no sense to the idea that the hostess has spoken falsely (though 
ineptly if there are no rooms on the #rst (oor). Later that evening, a$er his last Porto and 
bagaço do mesmo, Sid wanders bewildered, looking for his room. His hostess tells him, ‘It’s 
#rst (oor, last on the le$’. Here a genuine description which she relies on memory to get 
right.
What special systems illustrate here is thus that saying nothing in our present sense is 
relative to something. At #rst pass it is relative to in what special system we locate a thought. 
But locating a thought in a special system—#nding a description in the system which is a 
representative for the thought—is extra-systematic work, to be performed in conformity with 
Frege’s two ideas. It is Hilary Putnam’s point that where there is such extra-systematic work 
to be done, there is relativity to the world, or to the circumstances there obtaining. In what 
special systems a thought is represented, and, indeed, what special systems there are in which 
to represent thoughts depends, or is liable to depend, on how things are. How a thought is 
decomposable, and, correlatively, where the notion same thought applies, is, by Putnam’s 
point, occasion-sensitive, and, notably, world-sensitive. !e key here is the point that where 
we succeed in expressing, or in mentioning a thought, or, relatedly, that way it represents 
things as being, there are then, potentially, those who understand our mention. At which 
point Frege’s second idea, as elaborated above, applies. To which Putnam adds the idea that 
what is to be understood as to what was mentioned in such a case—how the mention was to 
be understood—is a complex made up of many, and potentially independent, strands.
!ere is a parallel to Putnam’s idea in a simple point about understanding thought-
expressions, that is, about recognising what thought was thus expressed (just how, if any way, 
things were said to be). Sid says to Pia, ‘!at blonde woman in the sequinned dress is singing 
‘My Way’.’ Who, if anyone, did he say to be singing ‘My Way’? Suppose there is a conspicuous 
item (person, Martian, robot) who/which, in the circumstances, one would have taken Sid to 
be speaking of (and no other relevant alternative items). But that item is no woman. !at 
garment is no dress (but a jumpsuit). !ose are no sequins (but rhinestones)—and the song 
is not ‘My Way’, but ‘As Time Goes By’ (moreover, the singer is lip-synching). Sid purported 
to be speaking of something of all those things (in fact not so) were so. All this forms one 
strand, or packet of them, in how Sid’s words were to be understood. !e #rst-mentioned fact 
about the conspicuous item forms another. At most one of these strands in what was to be 
supposed can, in fact, be to be supposed as to what, if anything, Sid spoke of. If the second 
strand has this status,—if we insist on the sequins, the dress, and so on—then Sid spoke of no 
one, so expressed no thought. !en, what was then to be supposed—that Sid spoke of such-
and-such conspicuous thing—is false. If this last is still to be supposed, then Sid said 
something false of, as it happens (say) a Martian in a wig. Applying Putnam at this point, the 
idea would be that things could be such that the second strand, and not the #rst, remains as 
what is to be supposed.
!e parallel is, e.g., with the predicative element, having momentum M, in, say, that 
thought about the (ying six-pack, and the question whether that thought has a representative 
in YW’s Newtonian system (or whether there even is, or could be, such a system). It is a 
dictum of YW’s system, as presented, that, in it, momentum is mass times velocity. 
Depending on time and place, that thought about the (ying six-pack may have been to be 
supposed to be, inter alia, about a certain physical quantity, identi#ed precisely, and 
essentially, by that dictum. As the world turned out to be, though, there is, and could be, no 
physical quantity so identi#able. Once again we can identify two distinct strands in what the 
thought in question would have been supposed to be. On the one hand, it would have been 
(to be) supposed to be a thought about a certain physical quantity which all solid bodies have 
(at a time) in some de#nite degree. On the other, it would have been (to be) supposed that 
the quantity in question was the one identi#ed by conformity to the dictum. !e world as it 
is, insist on this last and there is no such thought as that the (ying six-pack had such-and-
such momentum. So the #rst strand proves not so. Insist on the #rst, and there is such a 
thought, but it is not governed by the dictum. So the second strand proves not so. Putnam’s 
brief here is that, #rst, the world’s being as it is means, #rst, that the #rst strand is to be 
insisted on; and, second, that there is, in fact, no such system of descriptions as the one YW 
proposes.
Computing mechanical quantities in a Newtonian way remains, for most practical 
purposes, a good way of representing most near enough, slow enough mechanical 
phenomena. Such representations might be generated by a system much like the Tractatus’ 
Newtonian one. !is system would use the term ‘momentum’ in a proprietary way much as 
that system for describing patterns of dots on walls uses ‘black’ in a proprietary way (on 
which it applies to cells which are predominately black). On this use of ‘momentum’, a six-
pack would have momentum M just in case for all practical purposes it might as well have. 
!e dicta of this system would not be those of the Tractatus’ Newtonian system. !ey would 
not re(ect a structure in which momentum was mass times velocity.
A second notion of saying nothing is contained in YW’s remark (6.1222) that no 
possible experience could bear (so the world could not bear) on the truth or falsity of a 
logical dictum. For (the idea is) such dicta lack conditions on agreement with the world. If 
this is so, we now see, it would be an important point of contrast between special systems and 
a Grand one. A dictum of a special system is, per se, assigned nothing by that system as the 
such-and-such which is what it says. So, so far, it says nothing in our #rst sense. But this is 
compatible with the same thought which is represented by that dictum in that system being 
represented by a description in some other.
Putnam’s idea strengthens this point. If Newtonian physics had been correct, it would 
have been just what it was for a physical quantity to be momentum that it equalled mass 
times velocity. So there would have been no special system which contained a representative 
for a thought which represented momentum as precisely this, where within that system that 
representative was a genuine description of the way things are (with, thus, a de#nite 
condition on agreement with the world). We would have had no idea what the such-and-
such might be which one said to be so (other than just that momentum just is, by de#nition, 
that quantity) in expressing the thought that momentum is mass times velocity. So, as we see, 
whether this thought could be represented in a system by a genuine description of how things 
are (on present understandings of what this would be) depends on how the world is.
In the unstrengthened point above one might simply see a dissimilarity between special 
systems and a Grand one. What has one status in a given special system might have another 
status in another. But if a thought (and, so far, it is a thought, and not a representative) has a 
given status conferred on it by the Grand System (given such a thing), there simply is no 
other system in which it might enjoy any other. So, one would think, what is a dictum of the 
Grand System—that is, a logical dictum—could not be anything other than a dictum in any 
other system. !ere is simply no other system in which for it to enjoy such status. Which 
suggests that idea about logic’s immutability contained in Frege’s remark about boundary 
stones. Which suggests, in turn, that here our two notions of saying nothing converge.
But if a logical dictum could not but have been a dictum—if there is no such thing as 
anything in how things were having borne on whether it was a dictum or not—should this 
not also be true of more of what is necessarily so? Suppose Newtonian mechanics had been 
correct. !en momentum (what it spoke of as such) would simply have been mass times 
velocity, as there stipulated. So there would have been no system in which that thought was 
represented by what had a genuine truth-condition—by what engaged in a genuinely 
cooperative enterprise of representing-as. !ere would have been no way to provide a such-
and-such to make good on the idea of that thought saying something on our #rst simple 
notion of that. But this would have been a world-dependent fact: the world would have 
provided no way of identifying such a such-and-such. For logic’s dicta, it is in fact so that the 
world provides no such ways; so that there is in fact literally no saying, or even imagining, 
just how their dictum-hood might be world-dependent. "us far they line up with 
stipulations about momentum as things might have gone. Is there any stronger sense in 
which there is no such thing as logic’s dicta having been other than they are?
If there is a Grand System, there is no alternative to it. So what is a dictum in it cannot 
fail to be a dictum elsewhere. So there is no way that a dictum’s truth (or truth-inaptness) 
could turn on how things are. As one might expect if logic’s dicta are conceived as per F*. If a 
dictum is a thought stripped of all but its most general structure, it would be, one would 
expect, identi#ed (exceptionally) only by some given structure; hence not be multiply 
decomposable. Whereas di"erent representatives for a thought in special systems ipso facto 
decompose it di"erently. On the other hand, the point remains that decomposing a thought 
is extra-systematic work; in the case in hand, extra-logical work. Nothing said so far entails 
that how such extra-logical work was to be done, even where it comes to dicta, could not 
have been otherwise were things di"erent enough from the way they are. It seems, then, that 
we are not yet positioned to say how our two notions of saying nothing connect, or fail to, in 
the special case of logic’s dicta. All we can claim so far is to have distinguished these two 
notions.
3.5. Comparisons: His special systems introduced, YW comments, “And now we see the 
relative positions of logic and mechanics”. Just what do we see? Most strikingly, a number of 
glaring dissimilarities between special systems and a Grand One. Below are three bearing on 
what logic is.
First Comparison. !e dicta of a special system #x the way its elements exhaust the 
discretionary in how to represent: choose one and such choice is over. Logic’s dicta cannot be 
understood as using up discretion: there is nothing discretionary about whether 
representing-as is governed by the structure they re(ect. !ey do not merely lay down how 
some special form of representing is to proceed. !ey cannot be understood as in any way 
stipulative. !ey are nothing like the hostess’ dictum, announcing on your arrival that your 
room is (to be) #rst (oor, last on the le$. In this respect they assimilate to your hostess’ late 
that night reminder. !ere is a special system in which the content of what the hostess says is 
a dictum, and another in which that same content is a description. What is not at one’s 
discretion is (to add pleonasm) in fact not. Which would seem to make for something for 
logic to be a science of.
Second comparison. A grand system, as presently conceived, is made up of thoughts, 
where a special system is not. A special system is composed of decompositions, or things 
intrinsically decomposing in just one way—decompositions, of course, structuring 
proprietary subject matter in proprietary ways. Its dicta re(ect structure proprietary to it 
(and, given multiple decomposability of thoughts, not, per se, to its subject matter). Its 
intrinsic structure is imposed by relations sensitive to more than just logical form; non-
logical relations. Its members are items, to be which is to be generated as it does, to be 
structured accordingly. Just so that a thought, as multiply decomposable, is not a member of 
any special system (though a decomposition of it might be). By contrast, the dicta of a Grand 
System would re(ect the structure of the most general form of truth-preservation. Truth-
preservation is a feature of transitions between truths. And it is thoughts which are truths (or 
falsehoods); thoughts which entail and are entailed, thus which might lie along truth-
preserving paths. Hence, the idea is, thoughts compose !e System.
!ird comparison. What is a dictum of one special system may be a description within 
another. !e hostess, working in one system, by assigning rooms to guests, sets up a new 
system for describing them, then uses this to tell Sid how to #nd his bed. If a Grand System 
contains its dicta, or if these are thoughts, then a logical dictum could not be contained in, a 
fortiori be a description in, any alternative system. !ere is none such. Which seems to make 
a law of logic unlike a principle of mechanics. Which, as we have seen, might inspire the idea 
that logic could not have been any other than it is. But care is needed here. No matter how 
things were, there would not have been any alternative to what was then the Grand System (if 
the idea of such a system makes sense). So logic’s dicta would not have been represented in 
any alternative system. It is another matter whether what are logic’s dicta would have been 
logic’s dicta no matter how things might have been.
Logic’s dicta (if those of a Grand System) do not say something (namely, that such-and-
such) in the following sense. Just as a special system assigns its dicta nothing as that which 
they say, so, too, for a Grand System. !e function of its dicta, like that of a special system, is 
not to engage in full-(edged (cooperative) representing-as. (!ough, on the other hand, by 
contrast with dicta of special systems, nor are they in any way stipulative.) But this, even if 
admitted, need not mean that there could have been nothing which what, in fact, are logic’s 
dicta would have said (in a di"erent enough world). (!ere might have been no system for 
describing the world’s mechanics which assigned the thought that momentum is mass times 
velocity something which is what it said (again, in genuine representing-as).
!e second comparison is what raises the crucial problem for F*. Logic is concerned 
with truth-preservation. It is thoughts which entail and are entailed; hence transitions 
between which preserve truth or not. Hence the idea was, it is thoughts which compose the 
Grand System. In this a Grand System would contrast with special ones, which are 
composed, not of thoughts, but of (what amounts to) thought-decompositions. !e problem, 
in brief, is: given all else a Grand System is supposed to be, can it contrast with special 
systems in this way? Or might this, perhaps, be one respect in which a Grand System and 
special ones are parallel?
For a Grand System to be composed of thoughts is for that structure of it which its 
dicta re(ect to be a structuring of thoughts. What its dicta re(ect is, in #rst instance, a certain 
structuring of a domain with thoughts as elements: a structuring imposed by those relations 
between thoughts to which logic is sensitive—the logical relations, such as (logical) 
entailment. But what structures a domain also imposes a structure on each of its members. 
Here each member must be structured according to those features of it to which the holding 
of the just-mentioned relations (the logical ones) is sensitive. So, if the Grand System is 
composed of thoughts, its dicta would re(ect, for each thought, a structure which is thereby 
imposed on it. It would be a structuring of just those features in each thought to which its 
participation with other thoughts in logical relations (e.g., its logically entailing, or being 
entailed) depends.
But if thoughts are multiply decomposable, and if, as Frege understands this, this 
means that, for a given thought there is no set of ‘basic’ elements which are the ones of which 
the thought is composed, then the idea of the last paragraph will not do. (Given attempts in 
the literature to bagatellise the idea of multiple decomposability, an example will help. A 
thought decomposable into, inter alia, an element which bedeutet a concept (in predicating 
being a smoker of Sid) is also decomposable, on Frege’s view, in a way which includes no 
such element. (1892: 199-200)) For the whole point of decomposing thoughts is to identify 
in them those features shared with other thoughts on which inferential relations depend—
most notably, in the case of such things as predicative and naming elements, those on which 
the holding of logical relations depends. Conversely, a structure structured by logical 
relations (and the features to which they are sensitive simply would not be (given multiple 
decomposability) a structure of a domain of thoughts as such. A structure generated by those 
elements (or features) to which logical relations are sensitive simply would not structure such 
a domain. !e relations between thoughts are structured in no such way. (In fact, what logical 
relations are sensitive to is actually a certain abstraction from a decomposition: what 
abstracts away from all in it (e.g., the particular content of a predicative element predicating 
smoking of relevant items) which is none of logic’s concern.)
Suppose one forms a domain of thoughts (grand or not, but, say, closed under logical 
inference). Now, for each member of the domain, assign it some decomposition of which it 
admits. For each such assignment of decompositions to the whole domain there is one 
structure which logic’s dicta re(ect—a structure of relations between thoughts holding by 
virtue of those features assigned them on the relevant decompositions. No such structure is, 
as it stands, the structure of logical relations between thoughts per se. (No decomposition of a 
thought may, for Frege, claim objective priority.) Perhaps, then, the structure of logical 
relations between thoughts as such is a superimposition of all of the structurings 
corresponding to all possible such assignments.
But nor will this idea do. It presupposes, for a start, that for each thought there is a 
#xed determinate set which consists of all the decompositions the thought admits of. We 
already have reason to doubt this. One set of reasons comes from Putnam’s point: what 
decompositions a thought admits of is liable to depend on how the world is. But the general 
point here is just that assigning decompositions to thoughts is extra-logical work; whereas 
when one conceives of logic as identifying the structure of a superimposition, as above, one 
turns what is extra-logical into logic’s responsibility. In what ways can one decompose the 
thought that Sid smokes? Such depends on what else, besides that mention of it, would count 
as a mention, or expression, of that very thought. Would ‘!e concept smokes is satis#ed by 
Sid’ do the job? Frege thought so. Here I only pose the question. What about ‘One of Sid’s 
vices is inhaling tobacco’? Or ‘Anyone identical with that very person, Sid, smokes’? And so 
on. Again I only pose the question. A route to an answer is in Frege’s second idea above, 
applied in whatever occasion-sensitive way may be required for capturing what we are, in 
fact, prepared to recognise.
Assuming logic’s dicta to re(ect some structure of some system made up of some 
particular sort of member, that structure would have to be invariant across any assignment of 
decompositions to any set of thoughts. So it could not be a structure of a system of thoughts 
per se. !e domain (or domains) it would structure would be made up of items, each 
structured, intrinsically, by a structuring of some set of features which are those to which 
logical relations are sensitive. Such items might be decompositions for thoughts to have. But 
then again, if it is none of logic’s business which thoughts there are (e.g., nothing to logic 
whether there is, or is not, tobacco for there to be thoughts about), then, holding the extra-
logical separate from the logical, the most suitable candidates for the role of relevant item 
here are just logical forms themselves. What Frege failed to see, if he really did hold F*, is the 
just-mentioned incompatibility, hence its proper resolution. In this he would not have been 
true to himself. !is lapse, however, if Frege su"ered it, is not one YW was positioned to see, 
having confounded thoughts with a kind of Satz. All of which brings us to the next section.
3.6. Beyond F*: In 1917 Russell presented what is almost a version of F*:
Every logical proposition consists wholly and solely of variables … You 





!ere you have been going through a process of successive 
generalisation. When you have got to xRy, you have got to a schema 
consisting only of variables, containing no constants at all, the pure 
schema of dual relations … So that it is, as you might say, the pure 
form of all those propositions. (1918: 238)
Russell speaks here of propositions of logic, reached through ‘successive generalisation’, 
terminating when there is no more generalising to be had. So far, F*. Propositions reached in 
such a way would be among the most general. Where there was mention of an object, now 
there is only quanti#cation over objects; where mention of a way for an object to be, now 
only quanti#cation over ways for one to be. But Russell’s generalising operation does not end 
up where F*’s does. F*’s operation was meant to be thoughthood-preserving. Russell’s is not. 
A thought cannot consist merely of variables. Such are simply blanks to be #lled. A question 
of truth so formed is just ill-formed, no question.
Perhaps just so that Russell also calls the ‘proposition’ thus arrived at ‘the pure schema 
of dual relations’. But if ‘xRy’ represents (stands for) a schema, then ‘x’, ‘R’, ‘y’, are not 
variables. !ere is no instantiating on them. (!us quanti#ers are not missing here.) !ose 
letters, so understood, stand for, name, elements in the schema: a naming element, a (2-
place) #rst-order predicative element, another naming element. !e schema (what Russell 
also calls a ‘pure form’) is a form for a thought to take. !at form is instanced (exempli#ed) 
in such things as Sid freshened Pia’s glass, Sid owes Max a #ver.
F* moves from more speci#c to more general by operations which ought to preserve 
thoughthood: quanti#cations. For YW the operation, carried that far, yielded, not genuine 
thoughts, but dicta. Russell’s operation of abstraction is plain and simply not thoughthood-
preserving. It leads soon enough to what are neither thoughts nor dicta, to what could neither 
entail nor be entailed. Quantifying (thrice) over Sid Freshened Pia’s glass, one can arrive at any 
of a variety of thoughts, none a logical dictum. Abstracting à la Russell one gets to what is not 
a thought, but what may be of interest to logic. One arrives at a logically relevant form for a 
thought to take. A proposition of logic then might be that there is such a form for a thought to 
take; that such is a way of participating in logical relations. Is Sid freshened Pia’s glass merely a 
bad starting point for extracting laws of logic? Or is F* a bad conception of what a law of 
logic should be? What should Russell have been speaking of?
!e upshot of the last section is that Russell should have been speaking of exactly what 
he did speak of: logical forms. A logical form is a form for a thought to take. It abstracts from 
a decomposition for a thought to admit of, retaining from that decomposition only that 
information which is relevant to the holding of logical relations. Logical forms are, in the #rst 
instance, what logic is about. "ey, precisely, are what is purely logic’s business, what involves 
no extra-logical work. On this conception, logic does have a speci#c subject-matter: logical 
forms. Logic’s dicta are about these. One task for logic is then to tell us what logical forms 
there are; to generate these from some #xed ‘vocabulary’ (set of elements)—e.g., from such 
things as (being) (some given) naming element, or (being) (some given) #rst-order 
predicative element. Another task would be to generate truth-preserving sequences of (sets 
of) logical forms: for any element in such a sequence, and any later one, where any thoughts 
of that #rst set of forms (one thought for each form), and any thoughts of that second set of 
forms, if those #rst thoughts are true, then so are those second. A third task might be to say 
what a coherent assignment of forms to a speci#ed set of thoughts might be. So, for example, 
it might be a proposition of logic that for any thought of Russell’s form above (let us write it 
‘Fab’), if that thought is true, then so is the corresponding thought, (Ex)Fxb. In that ‘Fab’, for 
example, that ‘F’ would stand for a two-place #rst-order predicative element (here occuring 
within a certain form). !at it is of the type it is would be contained in its style—e.g., a 
capital letter. ‘F’ rather than ‘G’ would track recurrence, on an assignment of forms to a 
corpus of (decomposed) thoughts, of what it is thus assigned to.
!e general idea is this. Take the thought that the six-pack is hurtling towards the 
windshield. It is none of logic’s business how that very thought might be decomposable 
(except that any decomposition must be of some logical form). So nor does logic tell us what 
logical forms are to be carved out of that thought (except, again, only logical forms there are). 
But once that extra-logical work has been performed for some corpus, and an assignment of 
logical forms made to it accordingly, logic tells us what we must then live with.
F* began from the idea that logic is even-handed; equally about any thought as any 
other. As F* read this idea, those thoughts which were logic’s dicta would need maximum 
generality. On the present conception even-handedness is achieved in another way. Logic is 
about something very speci#c. Logic’s dicta do have speci#c, proprietary, content. But what 
logic is about is, of necessity, something to be found in any thought. It is intrinsic to a 
thought to entail and be entailed. So it is intrinsic to a thought to stand in logical relations. 
Logic just tells us all the possible forms of doing that.
A law of logic, like a law of mechanics, is a generalisation which holds across the 
relevant domain. If a conjunction is true, then so are all its conjuncts—a law of conjunction. 
A theory of mechanics aims to state what are in fact its laws. A theory of logic, or of 
inference, would aim to do the same. A theory, though, is but one of two familiar ways of 
expressing logic’s content (neither way a language). !e content of logic might also be 
expressed in a calculus. A (standard) calculus consists, #rst, of some vocabulary (set of 
signs), and some rules for generating from this some set of wholes (its ‘formulae’); then, 
second, another set of rules for constructing sequences of such wholes. Its formulae represent 
(i.e., stand in for, incarnate) logical forms. Its sequences stand in for truth-preserving 
sequences of forms, or, if you like, forms of proof. An English sentence, say, ‘Bachelors 
smoke’, speaks of bachelors as smokers. A formula of a calculus, say, ‘A&B’, speaks of nothing. 
A theory of logic, by contrast, would be a set of statements, employing such predicates as, 
‘__is a predicative element’, ‘__is a naming element’, ‘__is a conjunction’, and ‘__follows 
from__’. A theory which stated that all bachelors smoke would be committed to all bachelors 
smoking. If some do not, it is false. !e sentence, ‘All bachelors smoke’ has no such 
commitments, hence is not false. At best it merely speaks of something which is not the case.
!e nice thing about a calculus’ way of expressing logic is that it draws a clean 
distinction between logical and extra-logical work. A (successful) calculus expresses logic’s 
content in its application to given corpuses of thoughts, each mentioned, or expressed, in 
some one particular way. Suppose, e.g., that a given corpus contains a thought which, 
recognisably, so far as it matters for our current purpose, would be true just where two other 
thoughts were true. (As may be, the thought is that Sid drinks and Pia eats.) Suppose that, in 
a given propositional calculus, ‘A’ and ‘B’ are atomic formula, and that, here, in our current 
assigning of forms to thoughts, they are not yet in use by us. !en the #rst thought above 
might be assigned that form (relative to all else in the corpus) which is named in the calculus 
by the formula, ‘A&B’. If there is some other thought in the corpus which, recognisably, 
would be true just in case it is not so that that thought ‘A’ already stands for is true while 
some further thought (not yet assigned a form) is false, then, if the atomic formula ‘C’ in the 
calculus is not yet in use, we can, so far,  in our assignment of forms to the whole corpus, 
assign this other thought a thought named (here) by the formula ‘A—>C’. If, now, both these 
assignments are to true thoughts, then ‘C’ has also been assigned to a true thought.
Our changed conception of logic brings with it a changed understanding of Frege’s 
obstacle. Section II considered an idea which amounts to this: the hierarchy of logical forms 
(forms of ways to represent things things as being something) imposes a corresponding 
hierarchy on items in the world. !ere is a class of items which may be subjects of #rst-order 
predication, a class of items which may be subjects of second-order predication, and so on. 
Otherwise put, there is the class of items #t to be ingredients in naming elements, the class of 
items #t to be ingredients in #rst-order predicative elements, and so on. !ese classes are, as 
a matter of principle, disjoint. It is not just that the class of objects—the #rst class on the 
above lists—contains many things which could never function predicatively. Rather, nothing 
which could ever function as ingredient in a naming element could ever function 
predicatively. !e hierarchy, in so categorising things, thus poses the obstacle. (I here 
illustrate with just one of the several hierarchies which might be involved.)
If logic were thought of as structuring some domain to which all thoughts belonged, 
there might be some plausibility in this idea. For such structuring presupposes some one 
assignment of decompositions, correlatively logical forms, simultaneously, to all thoughts 
(whatever such an ‘all’ might mean). Here are the ways each thought relates to all others, each 
a way it relates to all others full stop, independent of any extra-logical consideration—hence, 
each way co-existent, conjoinable, with each other. !ere is no room here for the idea of 
making assignments to corpuses, sometimes in this way, sometimes in another, where 
making one (sometimes) admissible assignment may exclude then making some other 
(sometimes) admissible one; no room for the idea that not all admissible assignments can be 
made at once. !en, perhaps, one or another of our hierarchies has metaphysical conclusions. 
For then the question whether what is ever put to the work of an object in a naming element 
can ever be put to the work of a concept in a predicative element is simply the question 
whether a certain combination of forms can occur in an assignment of forms to a corpus. 
!ere is no room for the idea that di$erent assignments, perhaps to di"erent corpuses, might 
treat the same thing di"erently. In rejecting F*, though, and conceiving of logic as about 
logical forms, that route from a fact about representational structure to a conclusion about 
the structure of the world collapses.
For any assignment of logical forms to any given corpus of thoughts, there will be those 
items which function (somewhere) as ingredients in naming elements, so are treated (hence 
treatable) on that assignment as objects, those things which function as ingredients in #rst-
order predicative elements, so are treated (and treatable) as concepts (concepts1), those 
things which function as ingredients in second-order predications, and so on. Perhaps these 
respective classes of things must be disjoint if the assignment is to be coherent. Nothing 
follows from this as to whether what is an ingredient at one level on one assignment (say, 
some function) might be an ingredient at another level on another.
!e Tractatus idea that logic’s dicta say nothing is rooted in that conception of logic 
which Frege (by repute) and young Wittgenstein share. Conant suggests two reasons, within 
that shared conception, for so holding. One is that logic’s dicta are too general. !ey speak of 
nothing in particular. !ey have nothing but their structure to make them true. And, to use 
the Tractatus’ image, pure structure could do that only in its parts cancelling each other out. 
!e other is: one could not decide any question of truth without presupposing all of logic; so 
one could not decide the question of truth a dictum raised (if it raised one) without 
presupposing that dictum itself. Hence there can be no such question to decide. On our new 
conception, the #rst idea is simply untrue. Something of the second may remain. As Putnam 
suggests (1994), perhaps one cannot so much as entertain the idea of the falsity of a logical 
dictum until confronted with su'cient details as to how such might be. Frege’s laws of truth, 
for example, unfold a particular conception of truth, and of questions thereof. !ere are the 
pure questions there are to pose; each of these has an answer, ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; any set of these has 
such answers simultaneously (whether some such question has an answer cannot depend on 
the answer to any other). Given all this the features of those  connectives of thoughts which 
Frege recognises follow trivially. !is notion pure question of truth, though, is an abstraction 
from our actual representing. !at this sometimes mis#res, so that a statement might be only 
contingently either true or false is beside the point. !e abstraction is similarly resistant to 
many other apparent threats to these features of what underlies it. Still, such features are 
recognisable in it, and, recognisably, such as might prove assumptions with alternatives. A 
suggestion that truth does not have quite this structure need not prove unevaluable.
What do they say? And to what might this be hostage? !ey might, of course, say 
nothing in the sense that there is no saying what they say, though not in the sense that there 
is no such thing as the world bearing on whether what they say is so. At #rst glance such 
might seem so. A dictum might be, for example, that if a conjunction is true, then so are all 
its conjuncts. Informative, it might seem at #rst. But if we pursue the question what a 
conjunction is to be understood to be here, the answer is: by de#nition, a compounding of 
thoughts such that the compound is true just in case all its component thoughts are. At 
which point the law once again appears empty. (!ough still not because of its great 
generality.)
But if logic has commitments, these plausibly lie elsewhere. Logic generates a set of 
logical forms. !ese are, according to it, the forms there are for thoughts to take. So wherever 
we identify a thought—wherever a question of truth arises, or is encountered—this thought 
is always correctly assignable some such form. !oughts are so representable. No thought 
could fail to be assignable at least some form logic generates. For any form, there are thoughts 
which take it. Further, those transitions from thoughts to thoughts which logic licenses are, 
not just truth-preserving but thought-hood preserving, so that for any (correct) assignment 
of forms to a corpus, there is an extension of it which is closed under the inferences logic 
licenses. Conjunction, for example, distributes over disjunction. It is not as if all this is just a 
theory; nor as if there is any speci#able way in which all, or some, of it might prove false. Still, 
on our present conception, laws of logic are substantial thoughts. Finding ways in which 
experience might bear on the truth of a thought is extra-logical work. Nothing in logic itself 
can rule out there being such a way. Logic, by de#nition, applies to all thoughts. Whether its 
speci#c dicta would be its dicta no matter what—thus unmovable boundary stones in an 
eternal foundation—is another question.
3.7. Concluding: In 1945 Wittgenstein wrote that in 1929 he was forced to recognise ‘grave 
errors’ in the Tractatus (1953: x). As he worked his way from these erroneous views to the 
changed view of Philosophical Investigations, a central locus of such errors proved to be the 
Tractatus’ conception of logic. !us, in the Investigations the Tractatus’ idea that logic is not a 
science—that there could be nothing substantial about it, that its dicta were in principle 
immune to being borne on by experience—became the more nuanced idea that
Logic does not treat language—or thought—in the sense in which a 
natural science treats a natural phenomenon … (§81)
Logic is unlike a science in that its applications are unlike those of a science. As Wittgenstein 
writes in §81, we “compare the use of words with games and calculi … .” Logic provides, as 
do those calculi which express it, forms in which to represent those representations whose 
relations to one another may concern us; forms by which (if assigned correctly) a particular 
sort of bearing of the truth of some thoughts on that of others is then made clear. But on the 
question what a thought’s form really is, or that of when a thought would be of such-and-
such form, logic is silent. Assigning thoughts forms is extra-logical work, turning on extra-
logical questions as to how thought is ‘really’ (or for some purpose) to be articulated into 
thoughts. Correspondingly, as to those questions it thus leaves to us, logic does not require 
them to have an answer (at least tout court). Logic does not, as the Tractatus supposes, and as 
a science might, describe ‘the most general sca"olding of the world’. It provides ways of 
structuring representations of the world.
In our thoughts the ideal is immoveable. You cannot step outside it. 
You always have to turn back. !ere is no outside at all; outside there is 
no air. —Where does this come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our 
nose, through which we see all that we do. We never think to take them 
o". (Philosophical Investigations, §103)
We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it. 
We take that possibility of a comparison which impresses us for 
perceiving the most general state of a"airs. (§104)
In philosophy we are too o$en blind to the place, and the burden, of extra-logical work. So it 
was with Frege in his di'culty about concepts and objects. We suppose thoughts, or 
propositions, to have ‘that formal unity’ (as he puts it in §108) that would be had, as it is by 
formulae of a calculus, by members of some determinate system, generated by given rules 
from a given vocabulary, or set of building blocks (the very thing Frege himself, in his best 
moments, insisted that thoughts could not be). We fail to see the idea a thought as an 
abstraction from our historical representing; one which may be done in any of many ways for 
any of many purposes. A concern with such blindness, and its e"ects on our posing, and 
trying to answer, the particular questions we (philosophers) do permeates the Investigations, 
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